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AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE
,He was the grandS。n 。:E an Italian juggler who
traveled .to Chile with a group of entertainers and stayed
to become the Kingdom of Italy ’ s first accredited diplomat
to the Santiago government. He was the son of a gentleman
farmer whoacquired connections amongthe local aristocrats
but who never succeeded in becoming one of them. He was a
lawyer who won election to the Chamber of Deputies at the
age of twenty-nine , and became the youngest man in the
nation ’ s history to hold· a cabinet post.
Arturo Alessandri Palma was inaugurated as President
。f the Republic of Chile in December , 1920 , the first TTpOpU~
lar" candidate to be elected to the highest office and the
first chief executive of middle class immigrant background.
His victoryclimaxed a violent political struggle which , in
the midst of economic distress and social unrest , brought
the country to the brink of revo·lution. To Alessandri ,
called the "Lion of Tarapaca , fT must go some of the cred it
and much of the blame for the nature of Chilean development
in the twentieth century.
4
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I. THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SETTING
During mostof the nineteenth century the Republic
。f Chile was regarded as a model for stable and enlightened
government in Latin America. Its system of political parties
dates back to183l , and the practice of orderly transfer of
public office was firmly established shortly thereafter.
TheChilean oligarchy accepted the principle that' the oppo-
sition was entitled to a voice in government; and while
honest'elections were rare , at least members of the opposi-
tion could be seated if they managed to overcome official
control of the electoral machinery. After 1870 , three or
more parties were regularly represented in Congress , thus
minority factions were able to maintain continuity between
presidential campaigns. A party ’ s doctrine was more impor-
tant than its candidate--in·Latin America an attitude
uniquely Chilean--and partly because of that attitude , Chile
escaped the ~yils of personalism and caud ill ismo so preva-
lent in the neighboring republics~ Yet the President , in
practice , constituted an almost invincibleauthority who
directed the ?dministration of the country , influenced con-
gressional elections , and designated his own 릅 uccessor.
Domination by the executive extended over the courts , the
armedforces , and the provincial governorsand intendants;
,
,
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3and it was in no way curtailed while the Conservative Party
remained in power. With the ascendancy of the Liberals at
mid-century came gradual constitutional reforms which
weakened somewhat the control exercised by the President ,
but he still retained the prime power of intervention in
local governmentaffairs.
Chilefought a major war against Peru and Bolivia
in the years 1879 to1883 , acquiring additional territory ,
a strengthened economy , and a new set of problems. Almost
25 ,000 mestizo nitrate workers had .to be incorporat~d int。
the labor force of the north , and Chileansclosed their
eyes to theexploitation of those "inferior foreigners."
The expanded frontiers required more effective defens~
measures , which onthe one hand led to the professionali-
zation and Prussianization of the army , and on the other
fostered suspicion and mistrust in civilian sectors.
Furthermore '" significant shifts in the power
structure had occurred--economic and social as well as
political--and the upper"classes were able to challenge
the previously uncontested executive authority. In 1890
the Liberal Party , with a formidable majority in Congress ,
dared to resist President Balmaceda andto lead the move-
ment in support of a parliamentary form of government.
The Liberals also renewed the struggle for the old
i ‘
*톨"""'-
μ
principle of electoral liberty.l Events reached a climax
the following year when revolution toppled not only a presi-
dent , but presidential dominance as well; the entire system
collapsed.
Under the new regime , the President was to govern
in accord with the parliamentary majority , and he was
required to submit all his acts to the scrutiny of Congress.
The composition of the majority varied greatly , depending
。n the particular circumstances , and any splinter group
mighttopple a ministryby withdrawing its support of the
dominant coalition. During the thirty-three year exist-
ence of the Parliamentary Period , the instability of minis-
tries _reached epidemic proportions: 121 cabinet changes
involvingthe incredible total of 530 ministers. 2 Most
representative of political parties were the Democratic
Liberals who , according to Fredrick B. Pike , "stand as a
symbol of Chilean politics during the era. They were ready
to combine with any and all al l. iances and coalitions , or
to leave them • just as casually , provided political expedi-
ency so d ieta.ted ."
E’。r more.than.a.quarter.of.a.century , Chile wallowed
tAt that time the Liberals were profiting from the
practice'of electoral intervention, though many opposed it
on moral grounds.
~~ce0I.:di~~ to of~i~~al ~en~te .f_~gure~ cit~<:1 by
Alberto EdwardsVives and Eduardo Frei Montalva. Historia de
L으E pa~tidos pol{ticos chilenos , p. 13니.
5in pOlitical sterility under a cloak of outward stability.
There was little chance for even the most dedicated leaders
to plan and carry out progr~ms of national development; for
yesterday ’ s ally might be tomorrow ’ s ~oe ， and each party
faction had an effective veto. 3 Abuse of the Congressional
power to interpellate and censure Ministers , coupled with
irresponsible delay in passing appropriations bills--
fiscal blackmail , servedeffectively to neutralize what
little executive authority remained. In the Chilean tra-
dition , Presidents 략브 succeed one another according t 。
the provisions of the Constitution; and though that fact
is notable , it hardly constitutes a ringing endorsement
。f the system. Civil liberties of the middle and upper
classes were respected , freedom of the press was main-
tained , some improvements in communications and in educa-
tion were evident , and the personal integrity of the
numerouscabinetmemberswas creditable.μ The two most
3F’redrick B. Pike , Chile 삶ld 효브르 United States ,
1880-1962: The Emergence of Chile ’ s Social Crisis and the
Challenge 죠으 United States Diplomacy , pp. 87-8.
μCorruption and bribery within the bureaucracy have-
been noted by most writers on Chilean politics. The law of
1892 providing autonomy for municipalities was supposed t。
facilitate higher standards of government on the local level ,
but generally it hadthe opposite effect. Vote buying was
an accepted procedure that developed with the shift of lower
class population to the cities .. The oligarchy determined
that t h.e only way to render the masses politically harmless
wasto pa~ them to vote for the right candidates; one ’ s vote
came to be considered property which could be sold to the
highest bidder.
-빼현빼빼톨_.
6
discussed issues of the period were the stabilization of the
currency to slow the rampant inflation , and the expansion of
education under the control of the Stat~ instead of the
Church. However , years of debating produced no decisions;
the Chur’ch-State issue was not resolved until 1925 , and the
economic dislocation resulting from World War I made impos-
sible a return to the gold standard , so Chile continued her
loveaffair with paper money. While senator’ s and deputies
engaged in histrionics and Presidents passed through 관르
Moneda , the nation ’ s social problems were growing acute.
Unrest and violence were not confined to the
nitrate fields of the Atacama region , but became prevalent
in the coal mines of the south as well. The rural labor
force , predominantly mestizo , had existed in a "semi-feudal"
society until many of the landed aristocracy lost their
holdings around the turn of the century. Then the rural
masses , uneducat'ed and unskilled , migrated to the towns and
. cities , swelling theranks of the urban unemployed; and this
oversupplyof. brute labor only postponed the desperately
needed improvements in working conditions and wages. Labor
。rganizations developed slowly and protest meetings and
demonstrations were ruthlessly suppressed with force. 5
5The first serious labor movement began in the cities
in the 1880's and 1890 ’ s , but major success was elusive until
the founding of the Gran Federacion Obrera 、de Chile (FOCR) in
1909. Very moderate at first. it advocated an 8-hour day ,
k ‘
/
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Throughout the ParliamentaryPeriod the ruling
groups were unable or unwilling to recognize the inevitable
results of rising expectations among the lower classes tn
the face of economic distress. Only a handful of sincere
reformers dotted the Chilean scene , and these few received
encouragement from the tremendous volume of literature
which decried the miserable living conditions endured by a
large segment of the population. In fact , Chilean TTmuck-
rakers" produced a greater proportion of such books and
articles than did the famed Muckrakers in the United
States , but they failed to generate any concerted effort
to correct the existing inequities. Most of the reformers
approached their goalfrom a basically conservative orien-
tation. They defended the concept of a stratified society
with a class of brute laborers at its base , and they clung
tothe belief that the lower classes were willing to be
ruled. Since the masses did not aspire to a position of
greater influence , they reasoned , then unrest and agitation
hadto be the·;work of subversives. Fundamentally , this was
also the stan~e ofthe defenders of the· status quo; the
difference lay in the f~ct that the reformers recognized an
urgent need to easethe plight of the masses if the political
sickness insurance , and arbitration of disputes; however , it
soon turned to the left and by 1917 was avowedly revolution-
ary. See Robert J. Alexander , Prophets 으효 쁘트 Revolution ,
p. 55; also , Pike , p. 110.
’
.
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and social system was to remain intact. Significant improve-
ment in living conditions was essential to keep the lower
classes relatively passive and inert in the hierarchical
structure.
Whether motivated by enlightened self-interest or
sincere concern for the suffering population , Chile ’ s small
group of forward-looking aristocrats undertook an enormous
task , and their failure was due more tothe circumstances
of the times than to their own lack of ability or dedica-
tion. Chileans had experienced a p~rceptible decline both
in national morals and in the national morale. They had
lost confidence in the leaders and pride in their institu-
tioris. The economy was unbalanced 'and unhealthy; and a
sizable portion of the nation ’ s citizens--ill , unfed ,
unclothed , and without shelter--appearedalmost ready to
rise up and overturn the old order. 6
Such was the state of the Republic when Arturo
Alessandri made his entrance ipto national politics.
*
6See Pike , Chapter μ ， particularly the section
entitl.ed "Self Criticism: The Favorite National Pastime";
see also'Edwards and Frei , pp. 17μ-6.
4 ‘
;ι‘‘‘
,
-‘t
’iνsfig*§I
‘ggi*rt§·&
꺼
1915OFSENATORIAL CAMPAIGNTHEII.
out188니1ncreatedTarapaca wasofecn.,‘wrP
.
The
Pacific.theofthe War1nPeruacquired fromterritory。f
desertthiscenturytwentieththeofdecadesecondtheBy
politicalthebecomehadbeds ,nitraterich witharea ,
blindthecommandedwhodel Rf。ArturoSenator。ffief
judicialandadministrativeprovincialtheofobedience
protectiontheflourished underCorruptionauthorities.
com-parliamentaryaalthoughandgovernment;localthe。f
thereportedandinvestigatedpreviouslyhadm1ss10n
attemptsTa~apaca，1nser’v1cespUblictheofstatedeplorable
weresituationtherectifytoSantiago1ngovernmenttheby
drewadministrationLucoBarrostheofendtheAsfutile. 7
1915.7 ,Marchforscheduledwereelectionsgeneralnear ,
heldthatwascontestedbetoseatssenatetwelv’etheofOne
. by del R{o. 8
7Augusto Iglesias , Alessandri: Una etapa de la
democracia 닫낀 America , p. 332. See also-효Icardo Don。표5 ，
Alessandri ,-agitador y demoledor: Cincuent'a anos de his-
- ---- -- ---뜨꽉효 politica 브트 Chi工e ， pp. 156-63-:
8Department of State Files (Records of the Depart-
ment of State Relati끓 혼at단e Internal Affai끓 ;람Chile ,
T캉Tδ-T강29 ~ational Archi융등 Microfilm Publicat!ons , Micro~
copy No. μ87) ， hereinafter cited as nSF’. 825.00/10μ， G.F.
Summerlin toRobert Lansing , March 3r;-1915.
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Less than three months before the 1915 elections ,
A1essandri received a telegram from his personal friend
/ - ,.. .~ ,.. •.• _.Julio Guzman Garcla , the president of the Liberal Party in
Iquique , pffering him the Liberal Alliance (Alianza) sena-
torial candidacy for Tarapac~. Alessandri expressed.his
gratitude for the display of confidence but declined the
proffered candidacy , stating that he sincerely desired to
continue in the Chamber of Deputies. He wanted to spare
himself the ordeal of campaigning in a province where the
difficulty of opposing the caudillaje of Arturo del R{I。
was well known. Furthermore , he took note of the presence
。f other prominent prospective candidates , among them:
Balmacedista Oscar Viel Cavero , President of the Radical
/Party Juan Castellon , and Liberal deputy Maximiliano
Ibanez. The northern Liberal leaders anticipated a hard-
fought an~ violent campaign , and for this reason searched
for a candidate who notonly held the correct political
views , but who possessed the special attributes of courage
and of persuasion characteristic of the caudillo. In the
view of the Tarapaquenos , Alessandri seemed to be the only
man capableof running with probable success. Additional
'" _. - .support came from the poet Victor Domingo Silva who , con-
vinced of the necessity of nominating a candidate who-was
determined to put up a fight , contributed his enthusiasm
and skill as a writer and as an ardent patriot to launch
￥·
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A1essandri into the fray.9
One afternoon in late December 191μ , Alessandri
encountered del R{o in the gardens of the Chamber building.
At the mention of the coming elections , polite conversation
changed to heated discussion and the senator angrily shouted
a threat to Alessandri if he should be so foolish as to
accept.the opposition candidacy. That provocation dispelled
any doubts Alessandri may have had about running; he sent a
t~legram to Tarapac~ accepting the senate candidacy.10
Meeting in Iquique on January 9 , 1915 , the Provincial Con-
vention nominated Alessandri for the Senate and Rambn
Briones L~co as candidate for the Chamber of Deputies. A
/few 9ays later Victor Domingo Silva arrived in Iquique to
assumehis battle position as head of the Liberal paper La
Provincia. He declared that the contest would be drawn
between a progr'am of reform and prosperity and one "of
fraud and of exploitation of the masses for the benefit of
a few." The paper became the prime mover of the Alessandri
campaign.. Th~ vibrant pen of the poet sparked the enthusi-
asm of partisans of the Liberal candidate , extolled his
attributes , and emphasized the opportunity at hand: the
/liberation of Tarapaci from the spoliation to which ithad
9Iglesias , pp. 332-3;Donoso , p. 16μ .
10Iglesias , p. 333.
J,..
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11beensubjected by political caciquismo .
In lateJanuary , Alessandri departed for Iquique
to organize his campaign workers. His adversaries , rely-
ing on the aid and protection of the Montenegro Ministry ,
quickly effectedmeasures to hamper the Alianza cause;
and one appointment in particular merits notice. The del
R{o regime secured the transfer of prefectof police L파S
Vargas to the South , and in his place the Santiago govern-
ment appointed Rogelio De lgado , a daring and unscrupulous--
but "reliable"--man who formerly had been sub-prefect of
the police force of Antofagasta. Delgado was destined to
12playa critical role in the events ofthe next few weeks.
Alessandri arrived in Iquique Sunday , January 2μ ，
1915 , on the Peruvian steamship Huallaga accompanied by don
Luis Malaquias Concha , Democrat candidate for deputy. The
ship was met by groups of people on the dock (some were del
Rfo ’ s ruffians} and small boats filled with cheering , flag-
waving admirers whoswarmed on board the vessel to greet
the ir '1redeemer." Alessandri had to wait several minutes
before disembarking while his supporters cleared the dock
11Donoso , p. 165.
12Due to the activities of this official , plus an
assault on a Radical Party demonstration in Iquiquein which
mounted police charged the public with drawn sabers ,
A1essandri earlier had summoned Minister of Interior Pedr。
Nolasco Montenegro into the Chamber of Deputies. He demanded
that the Minister appoint a new police chief who could guaran-
tee order andrespect for the law in Iquique. Iglesias , pp.
333-μ.
f ‘
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。f Rifstas stationed there to impede the arrival of the
deputy from Curic6. The party then made its way to the
Chalet Suisse (a hotel at the edge of the dock district)
surrounded by enthusiastic adherents. The only unpleasant ‘
‘F
element of the entire day was the mud which spattered the
shoes and trousers of the travelers and townspeople; the
/
night before , del Rio had ordered a watering of the dusty
unpaved streets and the result was a large mudwallow. From
his window atthe Chalet Suisse , Alessandri addressed the
throng gathered in the mud below , describing his campaign
as one of liberation. He assured them thatthe cause of
freedom would prevail , climaxing his words with the pledge:
ttl have not come to fight , but to triumph. ,,13
Almost from the moment of Alessandri ’ s arrival in
Iquique , the campaign was characterized by unusual violence
that ranged fromattacks on the houses of political adver-
saries to assassinations. Gangs of del R{o's ruffians ,
paid with local funds andprotected by the police , perpe~
trated offenses day after day that contributed to keeping
the region under a reign of terror.
On hisreturn to Santiago , Alessandri denounced the
/
situation in'Tarapaca before the February 12 session of the
Chamber. of. Deputies , .acc~sing.the.+nterior Ministry .of open
13Iglesias , pp ‘ 33μ-5. Unless otherwise noted , all
translations are the responsibility of the writer.
f ‘
，，~’
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electoral intervention. He referred to the appointment of
Delgado as prefect of police , and to the maintenance of
armed gangs subsidized by the municipality. He als 。
expressed the opinion that the Government was incapable
of maintainingpublic order , and he suggested the humili-
ating possibility that foreign consular agents would
demand guarantees of safety for the interests of their
nationals. Further , Alessandri maintained that the Minis-
ter of Interior , who had final responsibility under the
Constitution for the conduct of elections , had refused to
s~nd a high-ranking army officer to preside over the bal-
loting and insure an honest·vote.lμ He contended that the
shameful episodes which had occurred in Iquique and in the
entire province of Tarapac~ could not be swept under the
rug by the government. (In the -opinion of one Alessan-
drista , more than just another legislative election , the
1915 contest in the Chilean ‘ Northcould be looked at as
assembled deputies the candidate thundered ,
the confrontation of two regimes: that of liberty of
suffrage onthe one hand and that of systematic and
official intervention on the other.)15 Before the
lμDonoso , p. 166.
15 Iglesias , pp. 335-6.
Alessandri did not hesitate to
parliamentary elections.
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I do not demand the votes of public
functionaries , policemen , and munici-
pal ~fficials who maywant to support
de Rio; I only demand that 'order be
respected and that the lives of the
citizens be defended , for if things
continue the way they are going now
the life of the august Interior
Minist_er will not be sufficiently
long ιfor hi~/ to repent the horrenqous
thing들 which-might occur in Tarapaca.
The Minister, Pedro Montenegro , who was in attend-
ance , answered vehemently and started a violent incident
during which highly insulting expressions were exchangεd
(a notuncommon thing , Chilean parliamentary politics be-
ing what they were). In Montenegr。’ s opinion , electoral
liberty was not menaced , and he stated that he was not
dis·posed to remove any provincial official without due
16cause.~U The remaining cabinet members supported the
position of theInterior Minister. After the brief dia-
logue there remained no other place to continue the dis-
pute but the field of honor , another recurrent feature
ofChilean politics. According to 프보 Mercurio , the duel'
was carried ηout February 13 on the estate owned by Luis
Barce16 Lira which he called , ironically , Villa Tranquila •
Onlookers included the four seconds and a 'doctor; however ,
16Iglesias , p. 336.
17Don080 , p. 166.
16
Although neither man attempted a reconciliation ,
negotiations between the Government and the Alianza were
initiated shortly thereafter , and among the several points
considered was the matter of the change of authorities in
Tarapaca. Undoubtedly influenced by the violent campaign
against interventionism conducted by opposition newspapers
following the Alessandri-Montenegro debate , President Juan
Luis Sanfuentes agreed to send to Iquique General Sofanor
Parra , whowould assume command of the military forces of
the province. Further , the intendant was replaced tempo-
rarily by an official of the Finance Ministry.
Up in Iquique new outbreaks of violence took place
prior to the arrival of General Parra and the return of
Alessandri to the North. On the night of February 26 a
/police official , Manuel Jes6s Maira , was assassinated by
/
a party of brigands as he left the Hotel Genova. Maira
was suspected of having refused to do the bidding of
Prefect Delgado. That same night , moreover , thieves
entered theιdead official ’ s home and took possession of
some papers.that would have been damaging to his superior
officer. l8 Two days later the Huasco steamed into port;
on board were General Parra , his aide Major Bernardo Gbmez
/Solar , substitute Intendant.Ricardo V~lez ， and the
’/ζu1Lny.,。s。m
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Alessandri party.19 Among those traveling with the senate
candidate were V{ctor Domingo Silva and ex-army officer
Manuel Lemus , the Democrat candidate for deputy from
Arauco who was also acting as Alessandri ’ s bodyguard. 20
Theopposition had been busy assembling a sizable
gang of toughs , paid by the municipality , to supplement
del Rfo ’ s police force; but the Alianza was not without
recourse. It too mobilized a well-remunerated and color-
fully named force of highwaymen: a certain Chacbn , alias
"El quince cobres" (Fifteen Coppers); "El repollo chico fT
(Little Cabbage); 1’El rubio cordero" (Blonde Lamb); "El
helado en paquete" (Ice cream bar); "El busca la vida"
(Scavenger); "El repollo grande" (Big Cabbage). These
men were recruited especially among the ruffians who
congregated near the waterfront. Thepreparations that
were made on both sidesseemed to be more appropriate for
a gang warthan for a contest of political opinion. 2l
During his brief tenure in Iquique , Intendant
V~le←z resisted Alessandri's d~mands to put the police
force under military authority , consequently he gave up
the maintenance of order in the streets , a determining
19Iglesias , p. 336.
20 noso , p. 173 (Note).
21Donoso , p. 167.
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factor in the violence that was to follow.
Also in the week prior to the election , the minis-
ter- 。f the Appellate Court of Tacna , Gustav 。 sepGlVeda ,
had arrived in Iquique on an extraordinary visit to draw
up the indictment for the death of Officer Maira , and
another against Prefect Delgado for arbitrary imprisonment
。f Aliancistas. On March 5 , after investigation , Judge
SepGlVeda 。rdered that Delgado be suspended from the exer-
cise of his duties , but the intendant refused to execute
the judicial decree. 22 That act of defiance was but one
further demonstration of the breakdown of Constitutional
authority; however it had no practical effect , for the
prefect met his death later that same night.
The elections were to take place on Sunday ,
March 7; on the preceding Friday , Alessandri was warned
on three separate occasions of threats against his life.
The first warnirtg came fro~ a policeman who years before
had been an employee in thehome of Alessandri ’ smother ,
and the other pieces of intelligence were delivered to
the candidate as he was addressing a gathering at the
Radical Youth Center·. 23 Apparently. not sharing. the
22Donoso , pp. 167-8.
23The warnings noted the suspicious movements of
Prefect Delgado and the armed mounted police force which
constantly accompanied him , giving every indication that
some type of plot was being hatched. Alessandri ’ s friends
~.
:t .
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anxiety expressed by his friends , Alessandri continued his
speech, concluding withthe admonition that the audience
should exercise great moderation and dissolve immediat~ly.
However , the rousing orations had so inflamed the ebullient
crowd that such a request was patently ridiculous. The
Alessandristas left in search of the police , striding t。
the strains of the Marseillaise played by an improvised
brass band , cheering the Radical Party and the Liberal
Alliance , and shouting down with the police and the pre-
feet. "iAbajo la policia! iMuera ,el prefecto asesino
del pueblo! l. Ret{rense los pacos! ，， 2μ
Alessandri , one" of the last to leave , headed in
the opposite direction from that taken by the throng.
Noting with increased concern the unusual darkness through-
。ut the neighborhood and the groups of mounted police lurk-
ing in sidestreets , the candidate changed his mind and
decided togo to the Telegraph Office to notify Manuel
Rivas Vicuna of the ominous turn which events were taking.
Alessandri pushed his way past the comisari。 。f Iquique
and entered the office , accompaniedby Manuel Lemus , sev-
eralassoeiates and his secretary. Scarcely had he
counseled himto avoid certain streets , and they indicated
that Lemus couldtake measures if he thought it opportune.
Iglesias , p. 337; Donoso , p. 168.
2μDonoso , pp. 168-9.
*훌
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written the destination of the message when carbine shots
sounded in the street , followed by scattered rifle and
revolver fire. Lemusran to close the doorto the street
and in doing so was wounded in the leg. Alessandri and
his compatiions sought safety in the small room that served
as the office of the chief telegrapher; as they burst
through the doorway they came face to face with Delgado
whowas half-crouched behind the desk with a revolver in
his hand. F’rom this point the accounts of the melee dif-
fer , but whenthe altercation was over Delgado lay dead
on the floor of the Telegraph Office. Outside , where the
police had continued to fire into the crowd and to charge
with swords raised , the toll was three men dead and numer-
ous wounded. 25
The employees who were caught in the interior of
the building retreated upstairs , followed by Alessandri
and his·companions and scores of demonstrators who had
broken into the office. Lemus , bleeding profusely , was
assisted to a smallattic room and given first-aid. Down
in the street the noise indicated that the police had
received reinforcements , and with little hesitat.ion most
。f the occupants of the building prudently fled via the
rooftops of neighboring houses. Alessandri recognized
that.i.t.. woul c;1. not. be.. considered. very. dignified [Or
25Donoso , p. 169; Iglesias , pp. 337-9.
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courageou설 for a senate candidate to be forced to escape
by the roof , and he feared the resulting reactionof the
electorate would be catastrophic. Therefore , he slowly
descendedthe main stairway peering into the gun barrels
。f the ~aiting guards. 26
Requesting that the sub-comisari。 accompany him ,
Alessandri went directly to the Hotel F~nix to seek aid
from General Parra. However , the general already had been
alertedand in a matter 6f minutes an army troop was dis-
patched to restore order at the scene of the tragedy. The
soldiers took charge of the telegraph building , driving out
the police , and they then B;ssisted criminal Judge Ismael
Poblete in setting up an inquest. The army also began
patrol of the streets and public places.
Shortly after 11:00 A.M. in the telegraph office
Judge Pob1ete convened the inquest; however , the following
day the hearing of depositions was continued by Gustavo
Sep61veda , minister of the Appellate Co~rt of Tacna. In-
Donos 。’ s estimation , the inquiry seemed prepared with the
deliberate purpose of muddling the whole matter and hiding
the truth. Only seven witnesses had been held; many were
allowed to leave with Alessandri without giving their
26The Iglesias version (see p. 3μ0) is based on
Alessandri ’ s recollection of the event. The statement of
witness Arturo Prat Carvajalas quoted in Donoso (p. 170)
differs somewhat.
顯驗搬廳繼總F爾爾羅壘펼廳驚繼購聽꿇羅驗廳顯廳짧編鷹慶顯廳§
22
names or making statements. The author concluded that one
does not need much perspicacity to determine who finished
off Prefect Delgado: from the stateπlents filed by
Alessandri and by other witnesses , the responsibility of
27Lemus was crystal clear. 41 The autopsy showed that in addi-
tion to a cranial fracture , the victim ’ s aorta was perforated
by a bullet from a Browning pistol. Thus the precise cause
of death was a massive hemorrhage from the bullet wound;
however , the inquest did not establish who shot Delgado. 28
The voting took place as scheduled on March 7 , and
the Liberal Alliance won an overwhelming victory in the
pr。vince of Tarapaca. Alessandri was elected senator and
Ram6n Briones Luco (Radical) and Luis Malaqu{as Concha (Demo-/
erat) were voted seats in the Chamber of Deputies , while the
government coalition succeeded in electing only two deputies.
Nationally , the Coalieionistas retained their majority in
the lower body while the Aliancistas gained control of the
Senate. 29
27Donoso , pp.169-70; p. 17μ ， Note μ.
28Donoso , p. 170; pp. 173-μ ， Notes 3 and μ.
Alessandri carried a Smith and Wesson. When Parra ’ s
aide examined the gun it was fully loaded and there was no
smell of powder. Iglesias , p. 3μo.
29 ....... ,... ..... ,,"",.. ,.. "'" JDS말 825.00/107 , Summerlin to Lansing , March 31 , 1915.
Throughout the country , 12 senators and the entire
Chamber of Deputies were to be chosen. The Coalition lost 2
seats in the Senate while the Alliance gained 3 togive it a
19-16 majority. The Coalition controlled the Chamber of
Deputies 66-50.
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In April , municipal elections were held , and
Tarapaquenos once again endorsed the Liberal Alliance
sLate of candidates .. With thatsecond' triumph , the
Alianza broke the hold of the corrupt local machine ,
~ ..
and the once-powerful caudillo del Rio disappeared from
the political scene. He returned to his provincial resi-
dence where he spent the last fifteen years of his life.
The poet Silva , whose mettle and passionate devotion t。
the cause had a decisive influence on the electoral con-
test , returned to playing his lyre and ·composing sonnets
to the victor. All those who were involved in the death
of Delgado evidently took an oath to keep secret their
knowledge. On his return to Santiago, Alessandri received
a warm and enthusiastic welcome from his supporters , unaware
that the shadow of the prefect would pursue him tenaciously
throughout his political career. 30
*
...
30Donoso , p. 171.
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III. THE EMERGENCE OF ALESSANDRI AS
LIBERAL ALLIANCE LEADER
The year 1915 also witnessed a presidential election
in Chile" one in which real issues were introduced. Emerging
as leading contenders for the nomination of the Liberal
Alliance- were Eliodoro Yanez , a sincere reform-advocate;
Guillermo Barros Jara; Ismael Tocornal; Ismael Vald~s Valdes;
and Vicente Reyes , incorruptible but past his prime. The
Liberalfriends of Agust!n Edwards , 'conservative statesman ,
tried to persuade him to bethe nominee of the Alianza , but
he was unwilling to desert the Coalition. Alessandri , by
virtue of his impressive performance in the r~cent senatorial
campaign , received anumber of votes in the nominating conven-
tion. However , in a compromise to avert the disintegration
。f the Liberal Alliance , the candidacy was bestowed upon the
comparatively colorless Liberal Party leader , Javier Angel
’ F’igueroa. 3l The convention of-' the Coalition parties was held
the following week , and on the third ballot Juan Luis
Sanfuentes received the nomination over candidates Abdon
Cifuentes and Agust{n Edwards. A senator from Concepcion
since 1906 , Sanfuentes was the leading member ofthe Demo-
cratic Liberal Party.32 용
31T"n T'l on r:- AA I팍프. 825.00/10니， Summerlin to Lansing , March 31 , 1915.
32nsF . 825.00/107 , Summerlin to Lansing , March 16 , 1915.
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Alessandri insisted that prior to the provincial
elections of 1915 he never considered the possibility of
33his becoming President of the Republic;~~ that senatorial
campaign , nevertheless , served to crystallize in the minds
。f the public the image of the vigorous parliament member.
It also recalled the memory of other Alessandri campaigns:
hisvi tuperation toward the admin istrationof Pedro Montt ,
particularly in regard to the 500 ,000 pound government loan
to the Casa de Granja y C{a.;3μ his arrests as the romantic
pamphleteer during the Revolution o~ 1891; and his note-
worthy tenure as Minister of Public Works in 1899 during
the regime of F’ederico ErrazurizEchaurren. A group of
enthusiastic followers in Iquique expressed those sentiments
in a pamphlet directed to the Radical Party assemblies of
the country , soliciting support for their endeavor to con-
vert the new Senator of the Desert into the future presi-
dential candidate. 35 A cUl~inating factor was the tour
around the country with Figueroa ’ s campaign party , during
33Alessandri , p.27.
3μThe Casa Granja operated eight nitrate offices ,
and owned the port of Coloso and the railroad of Aguas
Blancas that served fourteen nitrate offices in the north-
ern Chilean pampa. After the agitation that had shaken the
province of Tarapaca during 1907 , the firm announced that it
was threatened with violent stoppages in its districts and
demanded government help. Donoso , p. 103.
35Iglesias , p. 3μ1.
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which Alessandri received spontaneous demonstrations of
popular sympathy and affection which overshadowed those
for the candidate , and further seemed to affirm his polit-
ical potential for the future. 36
The presidential elections were held on June 25 ,
and the Coalition candidate Sanfuentes won by a small
majority of six or sevenelectors. There were minor dis-
turbances in all parts of the country , and several persons
were killed in Santiago. But the police and the army kept
the situation well in hand. Some Liberal Alliance leaders
cl~imed victory for their candidate by a margin of eight
electors , but higher officials of the Alianza conceded
defeat. Considerablebitterness was expressed by younger
members of the Liberal Party , many of whom stated openly
that Sanfuenteswould never be permitted to occupy the
presidential chair. Demonstrations by the Aliancistas
continued to occur nightly , ‘ always accompanied by minor
incidents. The Liberal Alliance leadership accused the
Coalition of ,having committed numerous frauds and falsi-
fications , and appointed a committee of party members to
investigate. In his confidential report the Ame~ican
Charg~ concluded , "It is well known that the country is
Liberal ~.e. ， favorable to the Alianz링; that frauds were
c;:.q~m i.t:ted9n.bot:hsides; and.that the Canoidatewho had.the
36Alessandri , p. 28.
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strongest financial support and the longest purse obtained
a majority of the electors; and there was no concealment of
the fact that votes were purchased right and left. ’r37
The Provincial electors cast their ballots on Sunday ,
July 25" and the resul ts gave 179 votes to Sanfuen tes and
17μ to F’igueroa (one electoral ballot from Iquique was not
counted). The Alianza leaders persisted in their claims of
fraud involvingsome twenty Coalition electors , and attempted
to have the whole election referred to a Tribunal of Honor
for review. 38 Following the provisions of the Constitution ,
the Congress met in joint session on Friday , September 17 ,
to scrutinize the election~· Irregularities were found in
several departments , notably Constituci6n and Castro; and
。ne ofSanfuentes electors for Valdivia was disqualified;
Sanfuentes remained the victor with 17μ electors to 173 for
Figueroa. Thus neither candidate received an absolute major-
ity of the whole number of presidential electors , and the
election was thrown into Congress where victory for
Sanfuentes w~s aforegone conclusion. According to the U.S.
Ambassador , Liberal leaders had no hope of winning; the
Coalition accepted the disqualification of its electors only
because it.commanded.a.safe.tnajority.in the.Congress.39
37nsF . 825.00/108 , Summerlin to Lansing , June '29 , 1915.
혐딛. 825.00/109 , Summerlin to Lansin~， July 13 , 1915.
38현F. 825.00/110 , Summerlin to Lansing , July 27 , 1915.
390SF . 825.00/113 , Henry P. Fletcher to Lansing ,
September 20 , 1915.
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The first part of the Sanfuentes administration saw
the customary parade of cabinets , as the Liberals pursued
their obstructionist tactics. Alessandri repeatedly raised
the issue of the corrupt police force of Iquique , and the
dispute degenerated into a personal battle between the
senator and the new Minister of Interior Luis Izquierdo
E’redes.μo The fundamental criticism made by those attacking
the ministry wasthat thegovernment was preparing to inter-
vene in the coming elections (1918). However , Conservatives
and Nationals viewed the controversy as an attempt to over-
throw not only the Ministry , but to undermine the parliamen-
μltary regime.
The entrance of the middle class into the political
arena was accentuated in the elections of 1915 with the
Alianza victories in Congress , but it was not until 1918
that positive signs of a desire .for reform in the social
and economic spheres appeared. The rebellion of the elec-
torate to 'which Alberto Edwards refers could be more pre-
cisely defin~d as "the rebellion of the provinces against
the hegemony of Santiago."μ2 The provincial elections of
March 1918 were hard fought , and money was used freely.
An article i~ a provincial journal noted that the Coalicio-
nistas Qpened.thebiddingat300.pesos.and were.paying μ80
μo
so , p. 196.
μlD。n。so ， p. l97.
μ2Donoso , p. 208.
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pesos per vote when their funds ran out. The Aliancistas ,
with only moderate financial support , quickly used up what
money they had.μ3 For strength to compete successfully
with the candidates of the Coalition , the Liberal Alliance
had tolook for adherents in the camp of the agricultural
or industrial plutocracy , in spite of the coolness which
members of these groups displayed toward Liberal doctrines.
For this reason the campaign did not have an ideological
basis. It did not propose a program to ameliorate social
ills or to correct abuses in the political sphere , although
the platformdid take notice of the country ’ s strong Liberal
sentiment and the determination oriented toward crushing the
influence of the Conservative Party.μμ The Liberal Alliance
gained a large majority in both houses , and the Coalition
was plunged into despair; President Sanfuentes even con-
sidered tendering his resignation.
The Coalition expr~ssed its willingness to turnover
immediately the job of running the government but Alianza
leaders wer& reluctant to assume the responsibility of leader-
ship until the new Congress began its deliberations. A dis-
agreement between theMinister.of.War.and.the.rest of the
μ3DSf • 825.00/116 , F’rederic de Billier to Lansing ,
March 9 , τ캉τ8. In the Senate the Aliancistas won 24 seats to
13 for theCoalicionistas; in the Chamber of Deputies the
result was 68 to 46 , with μ Independents.
μμ~Donoso, p. 209.
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μ6In Frei ’ s opinion , Sanfuentes gave an example of
his gr~~t p~~rioti~~ by ~ubmi~ti~~.~o the_~opu~ar w~l~ a~d
respecting theparliamentary tradition .. Edwards and" Frei ,
p .. 183 ..
μ7Donoso ,
p ..μ5Donoso ,
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other Aliancista magnates (who still claimed an important
following in Congress) to rebellion against the new chief ,
thus producing the dislocation of the victorious parties."μ8
Tocornal , offended because the President had not summoned him
to La Moneda , temporarily relinquished the direction of the
Liberal Party to ManuelRivas andY'fiez. Rivas related in
his memoirs that Sanfuenteshad offered to him also the
leadership of the Cabinet , but he declined and suggested
the names oftwo other likely candidates. He counseled
the President that the-appointment of Alessandri would be
a grave error.μ9
Finally , after three days of laborious negotiations
during which Y'fiez and Alessandri heatedly disputed the honor
of organizing the first cabinet of the Liberal Alliance ,
Alessandri was successful in forming aministry made up of
three Radicals and three Liberals. The Democrat party
remained excluded. The Ministry was integrated as follows:
Interior-
Foreign Relations-
Treasury-
Public Instruction-
War and Marine ....
Public 'Works-
Alessandri , Liberal
'-Daniel Feliu , Radical
Luis Claro Solar , Liberal
Pedro Aguirre Cerda , Radical
Jorge Valdivieso Blanco , Liberal
Ram6n Briones Luco , Radical
Sanfuentes may have hoped to neutralize Alessandri ’ s polit-
icalin~~uence.~yputting.~im.~t.the.hea~.pf.the.CabiQet， .but
μ8Alberto Edwards Vives , 핀르 frondaaristocratica , p.
202-3.
μ9Donoso， p. 10. The twq leaders suggested were Luis
Barros Borgono and Antonio Valdes Cuevas.
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his projected reforms. He utilized the interpellation of
Conservative officials over a local problem in the town
Sl。f Castroto eulogize the old Alliance ..J"" and to promote
the new one. He flattered the Radicals and Liberals with
his clev~r oratory:
The country has wanted to overthrow
this anarchic regime and return to
homogeneous and truly parliamentary
government. The high~st honor that a
man can attain in political life .
is to come tothis bench and be able t 。
say with pride: I am representing the
aspirations , the orientations and the
program of national ambitions that are
contained~tn the program of the Liberal
Alliance. 52
Alessandri ’ s performance was crudely condemned by
the Conservative deputyRafael Luis Gumucio , who accused
him of running for the presidency. The deputy ’ s attack
concluded:
Public opinion , after appraising whether
or not the Minister of the Interior
aspires to the presidential candidacy ,
will appraise also if his attitude in
the Castro affair , if his flattery of the
Radical Party , if his attacks on the Con-
servative Party and , above all , if his
51The dominant Liberal-Conservative coalition broke
up in 1873 and a new combination composed of Liberals , Radi-
cals. and Nationals became known as the Liberal Alliance.
In the 1920 Alliance the Democratic Liberals (Balmacedistas)
~nd the Democrats joined with theLiberals and Radicals.
Federico G. Gil , The Political System οf↑ Chile , pp. 셔 3-μ.
b In CastroL도he judge surrogate굽as forced to resign
ecause of unwarranted pressure by the townspeople.
52Cited iu Donoso , p. 212.
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magnificent doctrinair’e boasting and
his program of agitation , are to serve
the country or simply are to serve his
presidential ambitions. 53
Alessandri continued to hoist the standard of reform , and
he maintained that the electoral triumph of March 3 was
his popularmandate.
The other issue debated at length in the Congress
during Alessandri ’ s Ministry was the matter of reforming
the by-laws to permit cloture of debate. After having
~mployed the same tactics with devastating results , the
Alianza now wanted to end obstruction by the Coalicion-
istas; and when the Conservative legislators made concili-
story gestures the Minister of Interior took the opportunity
of effecting a compromise. At that point the Liberals came
to believe that Alessandri was sacrificing their interests
to those of the Radicals and Democrats , while at the same
time looking for support among the Nationals and Democratic
Liberals (Balmacedistas). Dissention grew more pronounced
in the ranks of the majority combination. Alessandri pre-
.;.
ferred a total cabinet crisis to a partial shake-up , and
his Ministri fell by vote of censure the first week of
September.5μ
In.retrospect.the.breakup of.th~.Liberal.Alliance
53Cited in Donoso , p. 213.
5μDonoso , p. 215.
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was inevitable. A hybrid alliance of basically conservative
。ligarchical elements with the newly emancipated political
forces of the provinces had to dissolve by virtue of its
own dynamics. But in the days following the brilliant
Alianza triumph at the polls , it was difficult for the
victors--in the face of widespread popular enthusiasm--
to turn their back on recently proclaimed principles and
join a new coalition. The conservative faction of the
Liberal Alliance resigned itself to lending apparent
assistance to a caudillo whom they basically feared above
all else. As.this conservative element waivered , the left
wing took advantage of their indecision and grabbed most
of the highgovernment positions and the administrative
posts in the provinces. (The responsibility for primary
instruction went to the anti-clerical Radicals.) 'However,
behind the scenes and with the utmost secrecy , the resis-
tance against Alessandri and his clique took shape. Heading
the covertmovement in the Chamber of Deputies was Manuel
Rivas.Vicu5~， whodid not advocate open opposition but pre-
ferred to assume an ambiguous position in the hope of domi-
nating the Alliance without destroyingit. 55 Such tactics ‘
might have met with moderate success in an earlier period ,
but.th~y.weredestined.to fail.in.the turbu~ent times ahead .
....
"'55Edwards , p. 203.
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Mere political maneuvers , no matter how skillful , could
not prevent a direct clash between the old social forces--
near"collapse , and the as yet amorphous but impassioned
movement that stirred a large portion of the country.
Slightly more than two months after the resigna-
tion of the Alessandri ministry the World War ended , and
immediate repercussions were felt in the Chilean economy.
Nitrate exports fell to almost nothing and the cost of
living rose sharply. Hardest hit were the workers wh。
violently expressed their discontent in the nitrate
fields and in the large cities. These circumstances
marked the emergence of th~ ·proletariat in the political
life of Chile , and one of the few who saw clearly the
significance of the profound transformation was the Radi-
cal deputy Antonio Pinto Duran. In the Chamber session
of December 26 , 1918 , he asserted:
We are spectators at the transforma-
tion of all our values. Our old social
organization , formed by an omnipotent
。ligarchy above and an uneducated and
m~serable people below , has been sup-
planted by the formation of a sizable
middle class--well-informed and intelli-
gent--that is able to analyze situations
and make decisions for itself. that acts
with confidence and certainty ’ •• • .56
Thus , the conflict had first emerged in the social sphere ,
but the.~epercussionswereimmediatein.the.p<;>l :j. t :j. cal arena.
56Cited in Donoso , p. 217.
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The Radicals , particularly the youth movement of the
party , became dissatisfied with their Ministers whomthey
characterized as representatives of tne oligarchy. Yanez
and Alessandri fomented this discontent and fostered the
ambitions of other deputies who wanted to become Ministers.
The latter part of April the three Radical members resigned
and a new Cabinet was organized. During the regular session
。f Congress in the summer of 1919 , discussions i ‘ n the Senate
were devotedlargely to the bill for compulsory primary
education. All recognized party leaders spoke extensively ,
thus encouraging much vitriolic oratory , especially among
members of the Radical Party who. adamantly opposed any
extension of Church influence in the school system. The
venerable Radical patriarch Mac-Iver referred contemptu-
ously to the new class-oriented creed , and he in turn was
bitterly attacked by younger senators. Alessandri spoke
at length during the debates , refuted intelligently the
arguments advanced by Mac-Iver , and extolled the reform
sentiment which seemed to pervade the atmosphere. In
Alessandri ’ swords:
The problems and reforms are not a
siren song , a sweet word that cajoles
and caresses the ear , as the senator
from Atacama has said; they are based
on fundamental principles of right and
justice , and they obey an imperious
present-day need. They strike forcibly
the duty and the conscience of the men
of state who owe them effective ·and
1
1
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preferential attention. It is not
acceptable that while some swim in
opulence , others are lacking abso-
lutely in food , clothing , h~using ，
inspiration for the spirit , and con-
venient andadequate rest for the
body. Th~ principles of solidarity ,
。f justice, and of social ~onserva­
tion demand the existence of a pru-
dent balance between the most
diverse social strata. 57
The debates continued to provoke recriminations pertaining
to the influence of the Church , the dirth of positive par-
liamentary action , and the ills of Chilean society gener-
ally.58
On the popular front , another large demonstration
took place in Santiago on August 29. The hunger ralLy , as
it came to be called , vigorously depicted the desperate
situation of the workers and produced alarm in government
circles. 59 · While discontent daily grew more intense among
the bourgeoisie and the masses , thepoliticians feverishly
gathered their forces in preparation for the coming
elections.
The i ,pcreasing agitation and unrest among the
Chilean people also provoked deep concern in military cir-
cles , and thepoliticiansintendedtouse the situation for-
57Cited in Donoso , p. 221.
58The primary education bill finally was passed on
theeve of adjournment.
59Oonoso , p. 222.
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their ownadvantage. The dissident faction in the army ,
led by Generals Guillermo Armstrong , Vi talicio Luis Lopez ,
and Manuel Moore , worked secretlyto strengthen the ties
between the chiefs of the various arms in order to bolster
the posi’tion of the President of the Republic and to offer
him an effective force in case of major civil disorders.
The.officers also hoped to obtain legislation improving
the position of the military and permitting its members
to hold government posts , both diplomatic and provincial ,
and to run for Congress. The tutelage over the government
which these men sought to exercise would have amounted t。
rule by military junta. 60 .~he possibility of Alessandri's
involvement in the conspiracy was widely rumored; the
government moved quickly in , preferring charges against the
。fficers.6l Those implicated were courtmartialed and the
affair was hushed up.62 In the opinion of the American
charge d'affaires: "The only significance which remains
is the fact that there is throughout the ’ Clase Media ’
6ODorIiso , p . 227 ; DSF . 825 . oo/l20 , Warren Robbins t。
Lansing , May 9 , 1919.
61Frederick M. Nunn , "Emil K1')rner and thePrussiani-
zation of the Chilean Army: Origins , Process and Conse-
quences , 1885-1920 ," (unpublished article·in possession of
theauthor , Portland State College , 1968) , pp. 26-7.
62 • •The trial dragged on through the spring of 1920.
The prosecution had asked for the death sentenc~， but that
was "pr.o forma"; a nominal sentence could be expected. nSF.
825.00/131 , Joseph Shea to Bainbridge Colby , May μ , 1920τ←→
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and indeed throughout the country at large the conviction
that the Executive and Congress do not consider seriously
enough the labor conditions and economical problems which
now confront the government. tt63 Donoso concludes: "This
was not the first time that the politicians had intruded
in the barracks , but the conspiracy of 1919 exposed how
far even A1essandri had gone in his taskof corrupting
， 6μthe armed forces.'
*
63..;...:.~ ..............._ IDSF. 825.00/123 , Robbins to Lansing , May 22 , 1919.
6μDonoso , p. 238.
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IV. THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1920
At the end of the year 1919 the Liberal Party held
a convention in Santiago , and the provincial delegates to
that meeting clearly expressed their approval of Alessandri ’ s
likely candidacy for the office of President. That fact
caused considerable uneasiness among the ruling clique of
the party , who questioned the background and qualifications
of thenew caudillo. His forebearers had held no important
political positions , and Alessandri himself did not belong
to the select circle from which presidents ordinarily were
chosen. He did not have a recogni~ed party organizati~n
behind him; in fact , during more·than eighteen years in
Congress healmost always had worked independently , never
subjecting himself to the discipline of any party. And
only occasionally had he joined the ranks of the Liberals. 65
These reasons were cited by the traditional elements of the
Liberal Party to justify their opposition to the candidacy
。f the "Lion .11 The important business before theconvention
was the formation of a new general board of directors for ‘
the party , and Alessandri fought to obtain members from among-
his strong supporters. The immediate task of this boardwas
t c;> ..~~J:~blis l;l .. rules. and .proGed l:l~~s . under. wl;l ich. t l;le next y~ar ’ S
65Alessandri , p. 28; Iglesias , p.' 3μ2.
μ2
nominating convention would select its presidential candi-
date.
The delegates divided into two distinct groups:
those who supported Alessandri ’ s candidacy and those who
66opposed ,it. oO The latter declared that they would not
accept the decisions of the extreme left-wing faction ,
and they promptly withdrew from the Liberal Party and
from the Liberal Alliance , thus destroying its newly won
parliamentary majority. The Rivas clique , which had lost
its position of pre-eminence within the Alianza organized
a'new alliance with Nationals , Balmacedistas , and a Radi-
cal splinter group. This c.o"alition supported the candi-
dacy of either Tocornal or Barros Borgono. 67 The new
political combinations which resulted were the National
Union , formed by Conservatives , Democratic Liberals
(Balmacedistas) and Nationals , and the Liberal Alliance
made up ofRadicals , the majority of Liberals , and Demo-
crats. 68 Alessandriwrote:
.. The error of those oppos ing my
candidacy , on separating themselves
from the party and from the Alliance ,
had very serious consequences for them.
They appearedto be abandoning their
doctrines.t9battlean.igdividual , one
66The reformist faction , c6mposed of middle class
and provincial elements , followed Yanez and Alessandri ’ -
while the traditional faction was led by Tocornal , Vald~s
Valdes , and Barros Borgono.
67Donoso , p. 2셔o.
68Alessandri·, p. 29.
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in whose hands they left the banner
of the Liberal Alliance which had
received great approval throughout
the coun try. .
I have said many times that ,
throughout my troubled political
career , usually I have reached the
highest positions , less by my own
effort than through the action of
my adversaries. More than ever , so
it was on this occasion: . gross was
the error of the members of Congress
who abandoned those who had elected
them in order to swell the ranks of
the opposition. Thus they opened，t。
me the~doors of La Moneda~. : . .69
Once the board of directors had been selected , the
struggle over organization of the convention commenced.
Almost as soon as it began deliberations , the board found
itself divided: one group supported a universal convention
in which all splinter groups of the old Liberal coalition
cOQld participate , while the other (backed by Alessandri)
maintained that the convention should not relinquish the
Aliancista banner but should admit onlythose delegates
who remained loyal to the party in the 1919 convention.
After much debate the plan for a closed convention pre-
vailed and ~he board fixed the number ofdelegates
allotted to each party and their qualifications. 70
Shortly before the scheduled opening of the
Alianza C.onvention Eliodoro Ya더ez seized the offensive
69Alessandri , p. 30.
70 Igl es ias , p. 3μ3.
L‘
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and toured thesouthern provinces , delivering a series of
speeches in which he explained the position of the Liberal
Alliance , and through which he hoped to gain support for
his own candidacy. This action by a coalition candidate
was a no~el occurrence in Chilean electoral practice and
Yanez was·warmly praised for his initiative. Their curi-
。sity aroused , the people gathered in considerable numbers
to hear the voice of the prestigious statesman , alth6ugh
his academic style , his quiet manner , and the wisdom of
his opinions did n6t excite the provincial audiences that
were eager for polemics and violent-oratory.
The Ya윈ez tour was discussed heatedly by the close
circle of politicians who began to gather at Alessandri ’ S
house to prepare his candidacy. All observed the urgent
necessity of a similar swing through the South by
Alessandri , and they were confident that the fieriness and
mettle of his speeches would a·ttract even larger crowds.
The senator agreed t.o the wisdom of such advice , but he
declined , stating that he did not havethe audacity to
appear in the same cities where Yanez had spoken without
having been specially invited. A few days later from
Concepci6n , Alessandri received an invitation from the
president of the Radical Center "Juan Castellon" to deliver
*
a political lecture in the municipal theater. Thus a major
obstacle was removed. 7l At stations along.the route.members
71Arturo Olavarria Bravo , Chile ent1:'e 브으E Alessandri ,
ν
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。f theparty greeted local leaders who approached the candi-
date to offer him their support. The train arrived at
Concepci6n amid martial airs provided by the local band
and loud cheers for the "Lion of Tarapaca ,1T the "candidate
ofthe people ," the "future President of Chile." The
enthusiasm of the multitude which struggled to approach and
embrace thecandidatewas tremendous , andwaiting at the
Alessandri was introduced by Juan Antonio R{os , who
noted that since Concepcion had heard Yanez , the Radical
Center believed that Has an act of true democracy" the
other leading contendeI’ for the nomination also shouldbe
heard. In his remarks Alessandri stated that the old guard
。f the Radical Party--those who earlier viewed his social
doctrines as subversive~-now understood that he was trying
to defend the public order by means of necessary evolution ,
and they had become enthusiastic supporters of his candi~
daci. 72 (T~e traditionalists , led by Mac-Iver , had waged
a valiant holdingaction against the social-reform-oriented
young Radicals , but in the end they.were.overwhelmed and the
Memorias politicas , Vol. I , pp. 6μ-5.
Among the members of Alessandri ’ s retinue were the
R욕dical deputies Hector Arancibia Laso and Rafael Torreblanca ,
Victor Domingo Silva , the young journalist Guillermo Bianchi ,
the poet and orator Juli~ Cesar Barrenechea , Oscar Garces
Silva and Arturo Olavarrla Bravo , Alessandri t s private secre-
tarv.
‘ 72ALessandri , p. 31.
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Radical Party assumed a new leftist orientation.)
Alessandri delivered a lengthy and stirring oration , and
at the conclusion of the speech the audience gave him a
standing ovation. The die was cast and Alessandri ’ s presi-
73dential campaign was off to an auspicious start.
The echoes of the triumphant visit to Concepcion
spread throughout the southern region , and the people
wanted to listen to the senator in order to make compari-
sons. In response to the rain of invitations that followed ,
Alessandri made a new tour , this time to Temuco , Valdivia ,.
Osorno , Puerto Montt , and returning by way of Chill&n. This
tour , just as the first , was an unqualified success. The
great majority of the Aliancistas of those provinces showed
that they preferred the valiant caudillo to the academic
。rator Yanez. /In the words of Victor Domingo Silva ,
Alessandri ’ s cause spread "the word of 1 iberty and the
gospel of right.，，7μ The presidential campaign broke the
traditional pattern of lavish promises made to effect local
improvement projects; it presented a brand new aspect which
the conservative elements equated with a first call to revo-
lution.
The Convention of the Liberal Alliance opened
Ap~il.2S， .l920 ， with .the.~~gist~ation.of.more.th$n.l~OO
73Olavarria , p. 69.
7아Cited in Olavarria , p. 71. The 'address was deliv-
ered at Temuco following a banquet in honor of the candidate.
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delegates in the Salon of Honor of the National Congress.
Among those assembled it was believed that the contest would
finally narrow to a battle between Yanez and Alessandri;
bets were placed and Eliodoro Y'5ez emerged with the best
75dds. ’ During the first session Armando Quezada Achar~n，
the headofthe Radical Party , was elected President of the
Convention. The nomination balloting was to take place with-
in the framework established by previous nominating assem-
blies. There were to be three free ballots , and then two
additional ones to decide among the three leading candi-
dates. The party membership agreed to vote in the first
and second rounds for their respective chiefs as was cus-
tomary; however , on the first ballot Alessandri receiv C?d
nearly μ00 votes. Since no candidate approached the neces-
sary 60% majority , the delegates agreed to proceed to the
second round. After having cast his vote , Alessandri made
his way through' the multitude toward the door , intending to
go hom.e and await the results of the balloting. A short·time
later , his afternoon tea with his family was interrupted by
a disturbance at the door leading to the street. The senator
went to investigate and was met by a noisy crowd of his sup-
porters who had come to inform him that he had garnered more
than the necessary three-fifths of the v 。tes . 76 용
75Alessandri , p. 31; Iglesias , p. 3μ3.
76Alessandri noted that on the second ballot he
에i
때뚫*
μ8
According to his own account , Alessandri returned
to the convention hall and was received with thundering
applause. He was lifted to the presidential rostrum where
Armando Quezada embraced him , then asked for silence. He
declared that Arturo Alessandri had surpassed by far the
60% majority required for nomination in the by-laws of the
Convention , and therefore he was entrusting to the "Lion 1T
the standard of the Liberal Alliance , confident that he
would carry it to victory. The delegates then demanded
that the nominee speak on his program. Alessandri wanted
some time to think and to put his important points in
writing , but the delegates were -insistent. Alessandri
rose to the podium and proceeded to develop his ideas as
they came to mind. 77
Alberto Edwards has said ,
Alessandri did not hesitate to tint
his candidacy with the colors of a
revolution without arms. He openly
declared war on all the formulas of
thepast , and even on the traditional
beginnings of middle class society.
He united in his program all the
affronts and dissatisfaction that
floated in the atmosphere ang_he
promised.to.remedy them all. 78
obtained more than 800 votes even though his closest friends
and the members of his family had not voted for him.
Alessandri , p. 33.
77Alessandri , p.33.
78Edwards , p. 210.
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Thus it is difficult to define the precepts precisely and
to categorize them within a logical doctrine; it was a pro-
gram of rebellion and protest rather than one of reconstruc-
tion. Alessandri took strong exception to the views expressed
by Edwards; however , the document offered as the enunciation
of his program appeared years later with the considerable
advantage of hindsight. 79
In Donoso ’ s opinion: "The program ~ontained nothing
extreme; nevertheless , it alarmed the conservative classes.
In that cul~inating moment of his career , the versatile poli-
tician • . ..could not help but appe ar as the agi tator who
,80menaced those who might try· to block the way. "UV Nor did he
attempt to change his image. The concluding paragraphs of
Alessandri ’ s acceptance speech amounted to a parody of some
earlier presidential candidates who had characterized them-
selves as conci11iatory elements , threatening to no one·.
He said ,
I want to be a menace to the reaction-
aries , to those who resist all just and
necessary reform
I want to be a menace to those who rebel
against the principles of justice and right;
I want to be a menace to all who remain blind ,
deaf , and dumb in the presence of the tran~.:­
formations of this historic moment . . .. 81
*
79 See A1essandri , pp. 3μ-7.
80Donoso , p. 2아 3.
81t:A1essandri , p. μ39.
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On May 2 , 1920 , the opposition National Union met
in convention to nominate its candidate for President of
theRepublic. The purpose of that assembly seemed to be
to select , not the best candidate forthe position , but
the best man to campaign against Alessandri. Looming as
an unexpectedly strong candidate was Senator Enrique
Zaiiartu Prieto who , with the support of the Democratic
Liberals , Nationals and some Conservatives , almost secured
the necessary votes to be nominated. The Liberal faction
that had opposed Alessandri favored the candidacy of Ismael
Tocornal , a man of vast experience in public affairs with
a solid and well-earned reputation. However , his name did
not catch fire in the Convention; perhaps because of oppo-
sition from President Sanfuentes and Minister of Interior
Montenegro , both of whom had suffered political setbacks
at the hands of Tocornal. Other contenders were" Guillermo
Subercaseaux , former Minister for France; Ladislao Errazuriz;
~rturo Besa , former "Minister of Foreign Affairs; Agustln
Edwards , Minister to London; and Luis Barros Borgo50. The
balloting began on Sunday afternoon and by Tuesday it
appeared that the Convention might have to adjourn without
selecting a nominee. Zanartu offered to withdraw but his
adherents were reluctant to give up the fight; the Tpcornal
and Barros factions seemed deadlocked. A last minute deal
gaγe the required two-thirds vote to Barros Borgono.
\,..
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muchappearingbutage ,ofyearsseventyNearly
theheldhadwh。professorlawformerawasBarrosyounger ,
alsoHetime.oneatAffairsForeignof。f Ministerposition
instruction ,publicof1ssuethe1nroleleadingaassumedhad
82Church.Catholicthehostility fromsomeincurringthereby
delegates ,thejubilantly byapplaudedwasnominationThe
vantagetheFromAlessandri.thanmorerejoicedonen。but
theto beBarrosbelievedhepolitics ,of pr~cticalpoint
hadheintellectual butanasknownwashecandidate;weaker
activist. 83politicalabeennever
metro-theconventions
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impendingtheforpositionsuptakenhadnewspaperspolitan
stafftheonwriterseditorialleadingthe。fOnecontest.
。fcriticbitterawasGarc~sDfaZJoaqufr1El Mercurio ,。f
AlianzatheselltoagreednewspaperthatWhenAlessandri.
resigned ,immediatelyDfazadvertising daily， 8μofpagea
thebysubsidizedwasthat El Mercuri。publiclycharging
President ’ stheofstaffthejoinedHeAlessandristas.
con-hewhereIlustrado ,DiarioElthe~conservative。rgan ，
toceasedEl Mer’curi。on Alessandri.attackshistinued
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comment editorially on the presidential nominees , devoting
its columns to municipal affairs of the most minor signifi-
cance. (Donoso interprets this poli~y as one of indecision
--keeping an ear to the ~round.)85 YiBez ’ daily 관르 Naci6n ,
one of the most powerful papers in Chile , was devoid of
editorial commentary following Alessandri ’ s overwhelming
victory· in the Alianza Convention , although it regularly
sold a page of advertising to the National Union organiza-
.1__ 86t1on.
The well-to-do segments of society expressed amaze-
ment and consternation over the easy win by the "Lion of
Tarapaca. 1t Domingo Amunategui asked , '.'What new moral or
political currents had puffed up the middle classes so that
they dared have the audacity to.combat their former masters?"
The day following the nomination a further expression of
alarm appeared in the press in the form of an advertisement
paid for by the National Union. Entitled "Hannibal at the
Gates"the item concluded: "Men of position: This is a.
matter of s~preme national interest , of our own personal
security. Take steps to defend it!" Manuel Rivas write
in his memoirs:
In the Club de la Uni6n , in banking
circles , among the earnest and
85Donoso , p. 2나1.
86~It was rumored that A1essandri had attempted a rec-
onciliation but Ya건ez refused to see him. DSF. 825.00/131 ,
Shea to Colby , May 니 , 1920.
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judicious people of the capital , the
Alessandri candidacy was madness; it
would be the final outlandish escapade
of a much-discussed individual. He
did not haVe the financial ~eans t。
mount a campaign , he did not have a
majority in Congress , it was purer
nonsense. 87 -
A most interesting reaction was that of the Radi-
cal patriarch Enrique Mac-Iver , who still wielded con-
siderable influence over his younger cohorts. He did not
attend the convention , but from the first indication of
Alessandri ’ s possible candidacy , he was against it. This
attitude alarmed the party leaders who sent a delegation
to try to persuade Mac-Iver to cease his opposition to the
Alianza candidate and to offer Alessandri his moral sup-
port. The old Radical retorted ,
But don ’ t you know Alessandri? Don ’ t
you know that he is a most deceitful
Italian , personalistic and a friend of
the unconscious claptrap that there is
in the country? Are you sure that once
in the Presidency , although he may have
RadicalMinisters , he is not going to
surround himself with favori ties
supplanting you and forcing you to retire ,
upiess you~b~come corrupt ~ith him. . . 788
Donoso reiterated:
From the first , the "popular JT candidate
shook the sensibilities of the lower
classes with Messianic promises: the
agit~tor， the destroyer , the demagogue
87 Cited in Donoso , pp. 2μ3-4.
88Cited in Donoso , pp. 2μ7-8.
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was in his element. He promised the
destruction of capitalism and the
satisfaction of all the needs of the
working classes; he presented himself
as the paladin of social justice , the
liberator of the oppressed and the
redeemer of the downtrodden.
Early in the campaign Alessandri coined several phrases
that he was to use with considerable success. He referred
to the wealthy classes as la canalla dorada (the gilded
rabble) , he cajoled the masses by calling them his chusma
Querida (beloved mob) , he repeated over and over that he
would be President of the Republic E르프흐 르 quien 요르흐르 (that
is , let the chips fall where they may).
A decisive element in the fervor that engulfed the
populace was the attitude of the student youth , the so~
called generation of 1920 , that saw Alessandri "as the
reformer of antiquated political customs and the representa-
tive of new social currents. Youthful idealism and altruis~，
plus the impact of the Russian Revolution , had brought a
degree of prestige and a modicum of success to the student
movement; and it was a potent force which could be easily
exploited by a man like Alessandri.
The new combination of parties that called itself
the National.Union received the vigorous support of the con-
servative factions. Grouped on its side were the m다st power-
ful economic forces of the country: banking , big business ,
industry , and the propertied classes. Its organ , 프L Diario
k ‘
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Ilustrado , reviewed the program of candidate Barros in
glowing terms:
It is like a comprehensive synthesis
of thatwhich all patriots would 'want
to see applied at all levels of national
activity. It does not try to dazzle with
excessive promises; it does not address
itself to the passions of any single class;
it indicates what is practically possible
。nthe roadto progress , in the concept of
a statesma다 A not as simply the demand of a
candidate.~ 'j
Campaign activity intensified during the month of
May. Barros , after a brief round of receptions , banquets
~nd organizational meetings in Santiago , went to Valparaiso
and then toured the southern part of the country , aided by
Ya전ez ’ politial following. The Union candidate did not
plan to invade the Alessandri stronghold in the northern
desert provinces. From all appearances the Liberal Alliance
had the better organization , and a number of young men from
the upper class were supporting Alessandri enthusiastically;
but there was considerable talk of bribery and corruption.
?ublicly , Barros ’ partisans predicted a majority of at least
twenty in the Electoral College ,90 though privately they
agreed that if the election results were reasonably close ,
Congress would unseat a sufficient number of Alessandri
electors to insure the triumph of Barros. The Aliancistas
89Cited in Donoso , pp. 2셔6-7.
90D$F. 825.00/l36 , Shea to Colby , June 1 , 1920.
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openly threatened revolution if their candidate weredenied
victory by such chicanery.91
Frequent protests were made by adherents of both
groupsover opposition efforts to disrupt public meetings
and ev~n to attack thecandidates themselves. In Concepci6n ,
Osorno , and other southern towns , gatherings to publicize the
Barros candidacy were interfered with and sometimes broken up.
Stones and other missiles were hurled at the nominee , but he
escaped injury. Disturbances also occurred in connection with
Alessandrista meetings , and public officials were cited for
failure to prevent disorders and for unlawful interference
with the campaign. Several intendants and minor officials
were removed ,92 but not before the executive committee of
the Liberal Alliance had filed a formal complaint against
Minister of Interior Pedro Montenegro charging lax enforce-
ment of.the law , and thereby had brought about another cabi-
net crisis. The Ministers all tendered their resignations;
the Alianza repudiated its representatives and refused t。
accept any" new cabinet integrated wi thout authorized Alian-
cista members. It also demanded ample guarantees that the
91T"\C"tT:l 0 1'\ r r\f"\ I므SF. 825.00/132 , Shea to Colby , May 18 , 1920.
92The intendant of Talca , a province south of
Santiago , was one of those called to La Moneda to answer
charges of interference. He was discharged for pernicious ’
activity and failure to perform his sworn duty. 므SF. 825.00/
136 , Shea to Colby , June 1 , 1920.
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government would not exert pressure during the impending
93e1ection.~~ El Mercurio editorialized on June 18 , 1920:
The resignation of the Alliance Min-
isters was a necessary consequence of
the declarations of the Allied parties
and forces the President to look again
for new men to form the Cabinet , thus
making him responsible for the gravity
ofthe situation that may arise. The
situation is very seriol펴 and the neces-
sity of having a responsible Government
becomes more urgent each day. It is
necessary to have a government with
ample and impartial foundation , in which
both tendencies may find effective guar-
ante•es , with men whose presence in the
Cabinet will inspire confidence to the
country . . . . This is an extreme case
in which we must proceed withenergy and
nobleness , consulting only the interests
of the country. Both candidates have an
equal interest in the prompt solution of
this situation , as a resigned Cabinet
cannot preside in the elections , not
having authority and responsibility for
suchacts.
관료 Naci6n , too , admitted the gravity of the political situ-
ationand in addition expressedconcern over Chile ’ s deterio-
rating position internationally in the absence of a functioning
Minister of Affairs. The is~Ue of submitting the boundary
dispute with Peru to arbitration under the League of Nations
covenant had been resurrected and demanded immediate attentionJμ
93Donoso , p. 2μ9; 원F. 825.00/138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 ,
퍼20. The deciding votes포 or censure were cast by the electro-
liticos , an independent faction led by Manuel Rivas;
9μCited in D햇. 825.00/139 , Shea to Colby , June 2μ ， 1920 ,
translated by the Embassy staff.' Shortly thereafter; Finance
Minister Viera Gallo was moved to the Foreign Affairs post.
••-•• •---_.- ._._----_._-_._-----‘-~‘~-~----'"‘i’........-......
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The leading Santiago dailies , continued to display
relative neutrality in their editorial columns , although
each regularly ran pages of propaganda paid for by the
opposing political organizations. The Edwards family ,
。wner of 펀 Mercurio , received considerable criticism for
its mercenary attitude and lack of patriotic spirit in the
face of the Alessandri t ’anarchist menace. 1T La Union , 맡르
Opini6n , and 프L Diario Illustrado continued their bitter
assaults on the Aliancista candidate and his platform ,
both in editorials and in the news columns; and the most
influential newspapers in Valparaiso pursued the same line.
In the outlying provinces , though , the papers were about
evenly divided in their political views; almost every small
town had two newspapers: one that was Liberal or Democrat
and the other Conservative or Democrat Liberal. 95
As election day approached , the intensity and
violence of the struggle increased; and the frequent public
statements--fraught with emotion--which were made by the
leaders of both sides , revealed how deeply dividedthe parti-
sans were. The war in the press narrowed to a bitter debate
overthe popular candidate , his program , and the sincerity‘
withwhichhe defended his proposals.
On June 13 , 1920 , as A1essandri was addressing a
“
large crowd fromthe balcony of his home , two shots were fired
95See DSF’. 825.00/136 , Shea to Colby , June 1 , 1920; 쁘F.
825.00/138 , S끊급 to Colby , June 15 , 1920.
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in his direction by a plainclothes policeman. The candi-
date ’ s supporters insisted that the bullets were intended
for him (one of the shells later was found imbedded in the
balcony woodwork) , while the opposition claimed that the
officer was trying to defend himself from those in the hos-
tile crowd who had .d iscovered his presence in their rnids t.
The incidentwas all but ignored in the newspapers , and
government officials tried to pass over the matter as
lightly as possible. 96
The following week , 딛르 Naci6n published an article
accusing the Aliancistas of having committed a long list of
。utrages during the course of the campaign. Among these
wereattempts to counteract demonstrations favoring Barros
by following them up with deliberate disorders perpetrated
by Alessandri supporters; the incidents cited were in Vina
del Mar , Coltauco , Putaendo , and in Los Angeles where a
fatality occurred. 97
One issue , injected into the campaign at the elev-
enth hour , promised to provoke serious results , at least
96T" n T.l 0 1'\ ~ r"\f'\ /
,.7 VnSF. 825.00/130 , Shea to Colby , June 13 , 1920; DSF.
825.00/138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 , 1920. Ambassador She륨→
repDrted having dined with the Foreign Minister on the eve-
ning following the shooting. The event was discussed in a
general way , "but nobody seemed to attach particular impor-
tance to it. 1T Shea also related that fears of serious
casualties occurring before or on election day had been
expressed in all circles.
97T"C'1T.1 O l'\~ r"\f'\ /nSF. 825.00/139 , Shea to Colby , June 2μ ， 1920.
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for a time. From the Unionista page of 훤l Mercurio grave
charges were leveled against Alessandri concerning pending
litigation with the National Bank of Chile. Some years
before , the candidate had borrowed a large sum of money and
had pledgedas collateral shares of stock in .Llallagua , a
Chilean-owned mining property located in Bolivia. When the
bank demanded payment , Alessandri authorized sale of the
stock , but the amount realized was insufficient to satisfy
the bank ’ s claim. At the heighth of the campaign the bank
insisted on a subsequent payment of 680 ,000 pesos , which
Alessandri refused to make on the grounds that the bank
had allegedly accepted the stock -as full settlement in the
first place. Furthermore , in the intervening years the
stock had increased considerably in value , so Alessandri
brought suit against the bank for three million pesos , the
difference between the original value of the stock and its
current value less the amount of the original debt. He
based his action on the grounds that the sale was invalid
because the written authorization had not been properly
notarized.
During the progress of the litigation , a ruling
adverse to Alessandri was made by the court; and a review
of the decision plus a replica of Alessandri ’ s lettel:‘ with
some damaging implications were printed in the newspaper.
The following day a scathing rebuttal appeared in the
l.
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columns of the A1iancista advertisement. It stated , among
。ther things , thatthe court decision in question had been
。btained through the influence of a bank official who was
also a counselor of state. This accusation caused a mild
sensation , because the only man holding the two positions
was Carlos Balmaceda , a man of some prestige and a nephew
。f the former President of the Republic. Balmaceda demanded
satisfaction , the representative of El Mercuri。 disclaimed
responsibility for the article , the Liberal Alliance Com-
mittee refused to accept responsibility and thereby lost
its opportunity tobuy space in the paper. After this
impasse the furor subsided as quickly as it had arisen ,
98and the matter seemed to be closed.
Throughout his campaign tours , Alessandri repeatedly
had proclaimed the extent of his poverty , and had heralded
the enthusiasm of his partisans as compensation for the
scantiness of his resources. In reality , his campaign
coffershad been filled generously , and his brother Jose
Pedro contributed a sizable portion of his personal funds
to the Alessandri cause. The National Union candidate also
had abundant resources , and he risked a considerable part
99of his personal , fortune as well.
98...... ,...'T""'I n "',.. "''' I월프. 825.00(138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 , 1920.
99 。， p. 251. The campaign funds spent on behalf
of each nominee exceeded three million pesos.
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The serious unrest apparent throughout Chilean
society , especially among the laboring groups , was manipu-
lated by the Aliancistas , but certainly was not of their
creation. Congress had convened the first of June but
ignored the urgent matter of the conversion law , and there
was a general demand in the press for enactment of some
100measure to stabilize the currency.LVV Workmen were faced
with high living costs that continued to climb steadily
higher , inadequate wages and miserable working conditions.
There were threats of strikes in the coal mines of the
south and in the nitrate regions of the north. Because of
a shortage in the bean c~op ， their basic food , the dock
workers refused to load beans for shipment overseas. There
was a shortage of 150 , 000 tons in the wheat harvest , also ,
andthe government considered an embargo on wheat exports.
Thelack of adequate food and other necessities caused real
suffering among the Chilean masses , and the political tur-
moil merely added to their difficulties.
Coal production had dropped about twenty percent ,
due primarily to the efforts of professional labor agitators ,
and thefuel situation became acute. Lights had to be turned
100............ ，..，..~..........，DS닫. 825.00/138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 , 1920. The
problem of cheap paper money dates back to 1892. By 1914 there
was much sentiment on the part of the landowners to return to
a metallic standard , but the dislocation produced by World War
I made conversion unfeasible.
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off tosave electricity and restrictions were placed on the
use of gas for cooking. All demonstrations by the miners
were suppressed , yet workmen ’ s organizations increased their
demands for shorter hours and higher wages. A labor delega-
tion sent to Santiago to present the case for the miners
contended that the menwere working eight hours a day and
were not attempting to curtail production. The representa-
tives claimed that the owners were stockpiling coal at the
mines in anticipation of higher prices. The ~ompanies then
intended to provoke a new strike to justify military meas-
ures in the coal region during the presidential elections ,
thereby hindering the free expression and action of the
mlners.
The situation grew so grave that the contending
political groups agreed upon a pre-arranged division of
electoral votes in the mining districts without reference
to the actual election returns. In the province of
Concepci6n , Alessandri was to obtain twenty-four votes
while Barros was to get twelve. Such an agreement , in
spite of the bitter struggle between the factions , gave
evidence ofthe genuine concern felt by both sides over
the very real possibility that the disorders might esca-
late to near anarchy.10l 4
101......... _ ,.............. JDS말 • 825.00/138 , Shea to Colby , June 15 , 1920;
DSF. 825.δ07139 ， Shea to Colby , June 2μ ， 1920.
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In Santiago on election eve , the casual observer
would have concluded that there was only one candidate for
the office of President of the Republic. The supporters
。f Arturo Alessandri Palma held almost continuous demon-
strations in the streets; and in the vicinity of the candi-
date ’ s home on the Alameda still more cheering followers ,
drawn largely from the laboring class , maintained their
vigil.
Election day , June 25 , dawned in an atmosphere of
apprehension and turbulence. The Aliancista voters , obey-
ing the instructions of the party leadership , appeared at
the polls during the early morning hours and cast their
ballots; and they then proceeded to organize themselves
into crews for the avowed purpos·e of observing the voting
to insure an honest election. According to Donoso , these
poll watchers assaulted opposition officials , intimidated
the voters , frightened the populace , and provokeddisorders
which the local police were unable to control. The first
reportof the results ga~e 179 electors to Alessandri. and
175 to Barros; however , the Ministers left La Moneda that
~ight.w~thout.providingofficial information.l~2
102 oso , p. 251; DSF’ • 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby ,
July 9 , 1920. The accoun는-Sy the American Ambassador
stated that election day , a legal holiday , passed quietly.
Only a few incidents marred the balloting , and those were
characterized as unimportant.
상.
S빼휴-‘-‘.핸--명압망g톨R톰M훌빼훌챙R짧얽톰!훌빼홉행뤘휠뺑웰륭*빠엠톨@힐정IIIH“..훌훌훨냥행P훌I짜빼~흉햇앓했훌뺑황$원
65
Thefo1lowing morning on its Alianza page , El
Mercurio ran a large photograph of Alessandri with a cap-
tionstating that he had been elected. The next day on
the Unionista page Barros was declared the winner. The
government issued no official statement; unofficially it
claimed that the returns were not yet complete. This
failure to announce the election results appeared to
arouse much resentment among the lower class supporters
of Alessandri , and the Committee of the Liberal Alliance
called a meeting of Alessandristas for one 0 ’ clock Sunday
afternoon (June 27 , 1920) in the Plaza de Armas. Als。
scheduled for the same hour in City Hall on the Plaza was
the. meeting of the Electoral College of the Department of
Santiago.
To preserve order and control the milling masses
who had paraded the streets throughout the night , mounted
police and mounted carabineros armed with rifles and
. lances were stationed at all streets entering the Plaza.
The officerin comm'and was to permit. no invasion of the
Plaza , and as an additional precaution several machine
gunswere placed in strategic locations.
Shortly before the hour of the meeting the
Aliancistas formed their procession , and with banners
flying and posters of Alessandriheld high they marched
toward the Plaza. The carabineros met the parade and
\"
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halted it , and hostilities ensued at once. The officers
finally charged the crowd which was growing by the minute ,
and in the meleeseveral demonstrators were injured. The
multitude quickly dispersed , only to regroup in front of
Alessandri ’ s residence on the Alameda. The numbers swelled
rapidly and so did the animosity toward the police. About
μ:00 P.M. the mob returned to the vicinity of the Plaza and
attacked the carabineros with sticks and stones. The
soldiers defended themselves wi th admirable restrain,t ,
although several of the contingent were wounded--one seri-
ously. Before the crowd retreated , a number of demonstra-
103tors also had suffered injuries.
Immediately after the clash , Alessandri was observed
walking through the streets with a small group of followers
assuring the crowds that he had been elected , and this
seemed to be interpreted by his partisans as a signal t。
10μcease creating disturbances.Lu~ Later the same afternoon
Alessandri addressed an enormous gathering in f-ront of his
house; the'contents of his speech were reported by an
American who was present in the crowd. The candidate reit-
erated that he had been elected , that the government was
deliberately holding back the news ,. and that he was deliv-
ering an ultimatumfor an official announcement within
103 -nn..... n n I"" 1"\1"'\ I펀료. 825.00/153 , Shea ·to. Colby , July 9 , 1920.
10μDSF’ • 825.00/133 , Shea to Colby , June 27 , 1920.
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forty-eight hours. Alessandri predicted that if the govern-
ment refused to acknowledge his election or if he were
assassinated , another messiah would rise to lead the Chilean
people to ultimate triumph. The cause of the Alianza was
just and was bound to succeed , he said , while the cause of
the rich aristocrats who had made slaves of the masses for
80 long was surely doomed. He concluded his remarks with
a plea to remain calm throughout the two-day period ahead.
After the deadline , if the government had not proclaimed
his election , he would consent to demonstrations of any
magnitude. lOS The speech further ~roused the fervor of
the audience , but the Alessandristas acquiesced to the
wishes of their leader and finally dispersed.
Sunday night the streets were comparatively quiet
with no large crowds parading , although a sizable gathering
maintained the vigil in front of Alessandri ’ s home. The
mounted police and carabineros remained at their stations
along principal streets and at the entrance to the Plaza
de Armas. ~onday continued calm , shops remained closed ,
trams and buss~s halted operations , and few private con-
veyances were to be seen. A general strike was declared
in Santiago , and Alessandristas held scattered parades but
there were no disorders. Unofficial statements by govern-
ment officials still claimed incomplete returns.
lO S1"'\C'l"" 0 1'\ I::: ("\1"\ /DSF. 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920.
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Information from numerous sources indicated that
on Tuesday afternoon , while throngs of partisans continued
to block the Alameda and to create a potential disruptive
force , Alessandri received word that since he was responsi-
ble for'the strike and disorders , he would be considered
guilty of disturbing the peace if he did not counsel his
followers to disband and return "to work.
According to the rumor , he was to comply with the
suggestion before 5:00 P.M. At that hour , if the crowd
had not dispersed , the carabineros would be instructed t 。
c'harge wi th lances drawn , and Alessandri would be arrested
for having caused the disturbances. It was evident that
Alessandri was influenced in some manner , for he spoke to
the assembled throng that afternoon and urged them to
return homeand go back to their jobs. He also renewed
106the assurance that , in fact , he had been e1ected~
i
106___ ............ ... J....... _. _ •. _. _ . __~똑F. 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920.
Shea reported that he could not verify the rumor.
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V. THE TRIBUNAL OF HONOR
The second phase of the electoral experience had
begun. Unlessone of the candidates received an absolute
majority of electors , the full Congress would make the
final determination , and Barros Borgofio enjoyed a comfort-
able margin in both chambers. Inthe face of that possi-
bility , Alessandri began to claim that the government
intended torob him of the electionby disqualifying a
sufficient number of electors. He appealed to his chusma
Querida from the balconies of his home , keeping them
stirred up and ready for action. In the week following
the election , Santiago lived under threat of mob violence;
numerous rumors circulated , and the well-to-do elements
took steps to form a vigilantetype organization to protect
107
property and maintain order if such should become necessary.
Businesses remained closed , traffic was non-existent , indis-
pensable services and supplies were cut off. In Donoso ’ S
view , the Alessandristas wanted to carry fear and anguish t 。
every home in the city; they spread the rumor that thedistrict
would be surrendered to looting , whereupon bands of 효으프으E
invaded the area. Over the signature of the directors of·the
Alia~za， telegrams.were transmitted to the provinces
107T'\n~ n l"\~ 1"\1"\ /편프. 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920.
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much dependence upon the unfaltering loyalty of the military
establishment. 109
Both political combinations held to the claim of a
majority of electors; and Alessandri demanded recognition
。f his victory , while the.National Union pleaded for an end
to the popular agitation. Furthermore , both groups agreed
that a change in the Ministry was imperative. Under the
pressure of a very grave situation , President Sanfuentes
108Donoso , p. 252.
1.09DSF . 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920; nSF’ •
825.00/l3~Shea to Colby , July 1 , 1920. Shea suggested
that a visit by an American battleship or two on or about
August 1 might have a salutary effect. He also reported
strict enforcement of government censorship to minimize
the importance of recent disorders. The American repre-
sentative of Associated Press was permitted to send tw。
telegrams to New York , then informed that future messages
would have to be examined before being sent.
The papers of the Argentine consul in Santiago were
cancelled by the Chilean Government because he allegedly
acted as news correspondent for a Buenos Aires newspaper and
sent out alarmist accounts of election disturbances. New
￥or￥ Times , July μ , 1920 , I I , 1: 2 .
---- The Chilean legation in Buenos Aires had received n 。
news of the outcome of the elections. The American Minister
at La Paz had received reports from Buenos Aires that Chile
was in a state of revolution. He wired the American Embassy
in Santiago for verification.
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organized a new Cabinet made up entirely of Liberals inclu-
ding representatives of both the Liberal Alliance and the
National Union. This Ministry , headed by Pedro Garc{a de
la Huerta , was presented to the Congress on July 1 and
was well received. 110 The following day 환 Mercuri。 edito-
rialized:
F’。ITIler Senat。r d 。n Pedr。 Garcfa de la
Huerta has succeeded in forming a new
Cabinet composed of three Liberals of
the Alliance. and three Liberals of
the Union. Senor Garcla de la Huerta
has a political personality which meets
with sympathy and respect in both polit-
ical groups. The other ministers are all
men ofprestige and authority in the
groups to which they belong .
Both political groups feel that their
rights will be properly upheld by this
Cabinet , because each has in it an active
and duly authorized director of the late
electoral campaign.
We are in urgent need of getting back
to normal again , so that the Government
may move forward again , legislation be
promoted and social unrest be avoided~
The writer concluded with a plea for support from all po1it-
-‘i. c라 D‘ artie를】끄1‘
The next step in the electoral process was the casting
。f ballots by the provincial electors in the capital of each
province on July 25. 112 After the electαrs had voted the
Congress appointed a joint committee to study all details of
ll0Donoso , 253. • I
lllris~. 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920 , trans-
lated by the Embassy· Staff.
ll21n order to cast his vote , each elector must first
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the election , including , claims of alleged frauds. If some
electors were found to beillegally chosen , they were dis-
qualified and their votes were deducted from the totals.
The Chilean Constitution provided that a presidential can-
didate must receive an absolute majority of the total number
of electors in order to be declared President; the magic
number was 178. If no candidate received the required num-
ber of votes , Congress met in joint session and by a majority
elected the President from among the candidates. The quorum
was made up of nineteen senators and sixty deputies , and a
decision had to be made by this body.113
Claimsand counter~claims， accusations and diatribes
contiqued to fill the press , and the animosity whipped up by
the Alessandristas produced a state of near panic ampng the
upper classes~ Gradually a movement developed to form a
Court of Honor composed of prominent men of both.coalitions
who would study the conflicting claims against electors and
have been recognized by the electoral college of each depart-
ment ashaving been duly elected. Such colleges were formed
of the assembled chairmen of the polling booths and they
issued to each elector an attested copy~of the act of his
election. The electoral colleges were not empowered to decide
。n the legality of such acts , but they placed on record any
claims against the certification of aparticular elector.
113.......... "r'I n n ~ r\,... /nSF. 825.00/153 , Shea to Colby , July 9 , 1920. The
deadline 륜or a decis'ion 펴as set at Augu닙 t 30~ and in the event
agreement was not reached by that date , an extension of time
was possible by means of a joint act of Congress.
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had prepared an editorial discounting the importance of the
event and its impact on Chile , which was to appear the fol-
lowing morning. At the last moment the editorial was
rewritten , presumablyat the suggestion of the government ,
and the published piece was in an entirely different vein.
After commenting that the revolution was most regrettable
and would serve to strengthen the opinion of the outside
world that South America was H a mass of comic opera coun-
tries • • • ," the article went on to review the history
of Chile ’ s recent relations with the two neighboring
nations and it concluded with a call to the country to
settle the internal politi6al divergence so as to be free
to devote all energy to what might become a serious inter-
national problem. 115 La Naci6n and El Diar fo Ilustrado
carried similar editorials that day. Ambassador Shea
reported that a ‘visit to the Foreign Office on July 14
conveyed to him the impression that the Chilean Government
considered the situation serious. Officials frankly stated
that troops were being sent to the frontier as a precaution-
ary measure in view of the fact that Peru also was known to
have massed about 10 ,000 soldiers close to the border.
Ext.ensive coverage of the international situation
continued to appear in the newspapers , and the fact that
the Bolivian army had sided with the revolutionists increased
115___ ,.. ..... _ ~~ I잃료. 825.00/15μ ， Shea to Colby , JuLy 23 , 1920.
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andsocialdeeptheofadvantagetaketoBoliviaandPeru
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116Donoso , p. 25μ . In 1919 , the National Assemb1y of
Peru had declared null and void the Treaty of Anc6n which h‘ad
established peace between Peru and Chile in 188μ"so a state
of war still existed.
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Foreigners living in Chile were required to register
--Peruvians first , and business houses were urged to discharge
Peruvians in their employ and advise them to leave Chile imme-
diatel’'y.120
The Chilean populace responded enthusiastically to
the apparent threat from her neighbors and the resulting
measures taken by the authorities. Patriotic demonstrations
were organized and parades were held almost daily , half-
holidays were declared , and there developed an attitude ~f
unity of purpose before a possible danger. The strikes in
the north and the agitatiQn in the coal mines subsided , and
working men generally showed a desire to help during a time
of crisis. There were some murmurings , however , to the
effect that the government had created an emergency to divert
public attention from the internal political strife. 121 The
notable exception to the nationwide expression of patriotic
f~rY9r w~~ the res~onse of the studegt groups and the more
119뾰w 프E프 꽉뾰효， July 17 , 1920 , 3:7.
120 -nl'"'l T:I n n ~ n n IDSF. 825.00/1μ1 ， Alusna Valparaiso to Navintel ,
July 21 , 1920. Anti-Peruvian sentiment increased and there
were demonstrations and disturbances in several northern
towns. The press contributed to the problem by printing
accounts of the harsh treatment received by Chilean nationals
in Peru. 므SF. 825.00/15셔， Shea to Colby , July 23 , 1920.
l21 T"\l'"'IT:I n n ~ nn I
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825.00/1μ~Shea to Colby , July 2나， 1920; nSF. 825.00/14~
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Furniture was hurled to the street and burned , and the stu-
dents who were trapped in the house had to flee via the
rooftops of adjacent buildings to escape the fury of the
mob. Three days later , the Federation was dissolved by
123government decree
That same night during demonstrations by two dif-
ferent crowds--one favoring the students and one -opposing
them--shots were exchanged; and a young member of the
aristocracy , Julio Covarrubias Freire , was killed and sev~
eral other participants were wounded. Donoso suggested
that the incident could have been a deliberate attempt at
intimidation.12μ The destruction by arson of the Federaci6n
Obrerade Magallanes took place ~uly 27 , with the coopera-
tion of civil and military authorities. One policeman and
four workers were killed and the building was burned to the
ground. The reaction in political circles was intense , and
a protest work stoppage of five days contributed to rising
partisan emotions.
In Santiago the last week in July , the Chamber of
Deputies was engulfed in a heated debate over a bill to
appropriate five million pesos for mobilization ,. another
p. 256. Throughout the night other dis-
mostly demonstrations against Peru. DSF.
to Colby , July 23 , 1920.
-
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instance of fortuitous timing. Later sessions of the Oon-
gress 뾰브 consider the tragic events in Punta Arenas where ,
following the disorders , the courts had taken repressive
action and had convicted and sentenced to prison a large
number of workers , students , and other Alessandri sympa-
125thizers.L~J Within Chile , all of these events generated
more ill will toward thegovernment; and from without ,
they brought much unfavorable publicity along with some
expressions of indignation and concern. 126 Peruvian refu-
gees arriving in Lima reportedthat the situation in Chila
verged on revolution , and travelers (American and European)
verified the stories of rioting and killings.
After the situation in Bolivia had stabilized and
the fears of imminent conflict with Peru had eased somewhat ,
attention of Chileans turned once again to internal politics
and the presidential elections. Both sides awaited the next
step in the electoral process--the review of the voting by
. Congress--which was set for the 30th of August; however ,
serious efforts were still being made to have the election
reviewed by an impartial independent body. It was generally
125Donoso , p. 256.
126One of the most famous victims was the poet ,
Domingo G6mez Rojas. Another , a Dr. Ducci--professor of
medicine and a former president of the Federation of Stu-
dents--was upheld by the Board of Public Instruction after
the government had tried to remove him.
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believed that a partisan decision would not be accepted by
the populace , especially in view of the fact that the results
。f the election amounted to a virtual·tie. Alessandri con-
sidered himself sure of a victory and he welcomed the organi-
zation of a Tribunal of Honor; while some of his staunchest
。pponents， among them Enrique Zaffartu , acquiesced to.a com-
promise because of the distinct possibility of international
conflict. Meanwhile , as further insurance , Alessandri had
been carefully lining up in his camp the army , both officers
and enlisted men. He sent Bernardo Gomez Solar to Antofa-
gasta for this purpose (intelligence from Tacna indicated
that the large body of troops quartered in that area were
considered to be safely in the Aliancista fold). In his
memoirs , Manuel Rivas affirms having seen uniformed army
。fficers at Alessandri ’ s house , indicating that the candi-
date had close dealings with officers on active duty.
Negotiations began between the two political fac~
tions for the purpose of establishing the Supreme Court as
the Tribunal , but after laborious discussions the idea was
discarded. 127
The Cabinet continued its search for a conciliatory
127The Liberal Alliance refused to accept the Supreme
Court as such a tribunal unless some of the judges were
changed. It then suggested that the President of the Senate
designate three men and the Chamber of Deputies elect three ,
with the Archbishop of Santiago.as presiding office~. The
National Union refused both proposals. D를F. 825.00/165 ,
Sheato Colby , August 20 , 1920.
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solution but to Manuel Rivas went the credit for finally
breaking the impasse. On August8 the seven independent
/deputies known as electroliticos , who completed the consti-
tutional quorum necessary before Congress could act , declared
thatthey would boycott the joint session unless agreement
was reached to guarantee proper and just certification of the
presidential election. 128 Negotiations continued and the
representatives of both political coalitions finally estab-
1ished the working rules for the Tribunal but failed to
agree upon the composition of the court. Alessandri pro-
posed the names of Isrnael Tocornal and Emiliano Figueroa ,
who would then designate a third arbiter to constitute the
Tribunal. The National Union issQed a statement on August
10 approving the ideaand the next day the Liberal Alliance
concurred. The two suggested names were accepted; also
added were those of the presidents of the two Chambers ,
Fernando Lazcano and Ram6n Briones Luco. The written
agreement between the two factions was signed on August '21.
There was still evident resistance to the idea of impartial
judges , particularly by Lazcano whose determined opposition
to Alessandri was no secret. The Senate President had
launched the Lion in politics many years earlier; but in
1920 Alessandri seemed to him a Bolshevik , an advocate of
s 9V iet. ~ocial i Stn and. an anathema. t.o. a metnOer. of the. old
128Donoso , p. 257.
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I then approached Manuel 뀔ivas Vicuna ,
who defended this solution /creation of the
Tribunal! with special ener향， and I sug-
gested to him the following as a formula
for him to propose: the President of the
Senate , Lazcano; the President of the
Chamber of Deputies , Briones Luco; and the
two former Vice-Presidents of the Republic
who were alive , Tocornal and F’igueroa.
These four would appoint to complete the
Tribunal Armando Quezada , Guillermo Suber-
caseaux , and former justice of the Supreme
Court Luis Barriga.
When my cohorts got hold of the names
that.were circulating as possible members
of the Tribunal , and without knowing that
I was the one who proposed them , they
shouted to high heaven complaining that of
the seven members who were to make up the
Tribunal , five were partial to Luis Barros
Borgono and only two--Briones Luco and
Quezada--to me. Ikept secret the informa-
tion that the men had been suggested t。
Rivas by me , and I was very pleased at the
uproar from my side , since that facilitated
the difficult task of obtaining acceptance
。f the names. The National Union would
~~cept.pnly those.men.~~o inspired.confidence ,
relates:
Shea to Colby ,
Colby , August 25 ,
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and the names that Rivas proposed
inspired confidence precisely because
。f the quality of the men and also
because of the resistance which those
names encountered in the ranks of the
Alianza Liberal. l30
On August 30 , before the Tribunal had hardly begun
its deliberations , Fernando Lazcano collapsed and died in
the salon of the Senate building. Donoso commented ,
There is in his death anemotion-
provoking symbol: it is the fall of
the oligarchy that had governed the
country for so many years. He , the
genuine representative of the tra-
ditional families , . . ,. saw as
inevitable the triumph of his protege
• caught up in the whirl of social
and ideological currents he scorned and
failed to understand.
The Senate rendered homage to its former President; then
Vice-PresidentAbraham Ovalle assumed his duties and als。
his position on the Tribunal. 131
Whilethe Tribunal continued its deliberations ,
news of labor unrest and political agitation regularly
reached the headlines. In Valparaiso a government inves-
tigation discovered the headquarters of an IWW organization ,
the group that had fostered the strike of longshoremen and
had carried on an active propaganda campaign in Punta
Arenas •.. Ttre. authorities .eng~ged "in a vigo~o l:l s" program of
130Alessandri , p. "52.
131Donoso , p. 260. Ovalle" was a member of the Con-
servative Party.
8μ
suppression; foreigners were deported , and Chileans
convicted of offenses against the government received sen-
tences varying from five to twenty years. The continuing
strife in Congress prevented the proper consideration of
legislative proposals which could have improved the condi-
tions of the lower classes. (The acute dissatisfaction
was not limited to the laborers , either , but was expressed
in most circles.) Another Cabinet crisis added to the
difficulties experienced by President Sanfuentes , and
although the Alianza Ministers withdrew their resigna-
tions , the political atmosphere remained tense. Troops
were kept mobilized in the northern provinces in the face
of mounting criticism, even though reports emanating from
Peruand Bolivia made ridiculous .the idea of an impending
invasion of Chile. Isolated attacks on Peruvian property
continued , andclose to 500 nationals had already returned
to Peru or were preparing to do so at the first opportunity.
Thus the last months of the Sanfuentes administration were
marred by protest , violence , repression , and (in the opinion
of some) persecution. The only bright spot on therecord
was the passage of the compulsory primary educa~ion law the
end~of August. 132
During the month of September the Tribunal of Honor
h~~Q← 4aily.sessions.~nd.heard.representatives.ofeacb.side
132Donoso , p. 261.
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Borgano.Barrosofdefense1nTribunaltheonposition
deci-justathatseetowasplacehisthatcontendedHe
criticismthebitterly denouncedheandreached ,was홉 ion
pressThecontests.severalonvotehisaga1nstdirected
feelingearliertheandmatter ,thet。spacemuchdevoted
statement;n。madeBarrosdespair.toturnedoptimism。f
133Chilean electoral law provided thatcertificates
。f results from each district must be drawn up on special
paper bearing the seal of the Senate and must be delivered
in envelopes sealed in the same manner. The paper was dis-
tributed shortly before the election to theproper elec-
torat authorities by the Fiscal officers ofeach department.
This procedure was established in order to prevent falsi-
fied returns in instances where all the electoraljudges
belonged to one political combination. Only one certificate
~as provided , and it was signed by all the judges and polit-
ical representatives presenf. It- could not be-altered
easily , and a duplicate would be detected. 펀F. 825.00/173 ,
Shea to Colby , September 17 , 1920.
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everyhadheannouncedimmediatelyAlessandrihowever ,
Tribunaltheofmemberstheofintegritythe1nconfidence
anywithoutreachedbewouldverdictacertainwasheand
atday ,nextThefaction.politicaleitherfrominfluence
Antonioindependent deputies ,and。f Liberalurgingthe
thesolvetoattempttocommitteeaheadtoagreedHuneeus
명·1
il
바ssajudgesbothtoletterswrotegroupThecrisis.
theondutytheircorrect:waspositiontheirthatthem
partyforregardwithoutdecisionareachtowasTribunal
to wi thdrawagreedTocornalandSubercaseauxaffiliation.
itsresumetoablewasTribunaltheandresignationstheir
labors.13μ
circulatedrumor‘a30of September댄--LmtheOn
andday ,thatdecisionitsrendercourt wouldthethat
offront1nwaitedcrowdlargeaafternoonthethroughout
seven-atcameannouncementThebuilding.Congressthe
itsdeliveredHonorofTribunaltheσ。·m핸vethe1nthirty
notificationofficialThe。f Alessandri.favor1nverdict
theandNational Uniontheofrepresentativesthetosent
follows:
I have the honor to communicate to you
that the Tribunal of Arbitration , after
having studied the different clain며 s pre-
sented in regard to the presidential elec-
tion , has reached a decision that SeRor
Alessandri received 17l_votes and Senor
asreadLiberal Alliance
Colby ,toShea825.00/176 ’nSF.262;p.잉밍o9mlD
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Barros Borgono 176. One elector in
Cachapoal , who cast his vote for
Barros , was not considered. Therefore
the Tr ibunal approved , acc.ording to
Article 8 of the basis of its organi-
zation the following decision: Senor
Alessandri , having received the major-
ity of votes , according ~o the claims
presented , has the best right to be
considered elected.
(signed) Luis Barriga , President of
the Tribunal ..
Ramon Gutierrez A.~ Secretary.
The final vote of the seven members of the court gave five
votes toAlessandri and two to Barros.135
The news of the results brought jubilation to the
ranks of the.Liberal Alliance and gloom to the adherents of
the National Union. The bitter recriminations against
Guillermo Subercaseaux resulted in his eventual resignation
as president of the National Party. The Congress met in
joint session on October 6 , and (under the provisions of the
Constitution and of those that were agreed upon in the Act
of the constitution of the Tribunal) it proceeded to elect
Alessandri President of the Republic. Senator Gonzalo
Bu1nes--on behalf of the Unionistas--made the first speech ,
stating in part:
• the National Union must fu~fill the
painful duty of concurring in the proclama-
tion of the candidate as President which we
opposed in the campaign; however~ we submit
to this duty because it is an obligation
• ~~~.9~q~d .. by our con~1= itution... The. Lib~ral
135뻗뀐 ￥맨￥ Times , October 2 , 1920 , 17:3; 앨말. 825.00/
176 , Shea~ Colby , October 1 , 1920 , translated b뚱-the Embassy
staff.
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Union fulfills this duty in order t 。
redeem the political pledge it took
(to abide by the decision of the
Tribunal of Honor) though in doing so
it is necessary to repress many justi-
fied prot~~ts~ I do not wish to open
a dabate 갈i당 on the question; but I
repeat that our silence is a great
sacrifice. The National Union asks
all its members to give to Senor
Alessandri the necessary votes which
will proclaim him constitutionally
elected. At the same time the National
Union prays that God may guard the des-
tinies of the nation , that our fears may
not be realized , that our country may
continue on the road of liberty and
progress and that our future~~~ybe
worthy of our glorious past. 136
A short debate followed Bulnes ’ address and then the vote
was taken; eighty-seven ballots were case for Alessandri and
twenty-nine were case in blank. 137 Vice-President Ovalle
then declared that Arturo Alessandri had been elected
President of the Republic for the period beginning
December 23 , 1920 and ending December 23 , 1925.
Following the brief session of the Congress , the
President-Elect issued a proclamation in which he promised
to respect electoral liberty , maintain the parliamentary
regime , and search for harmonious solutions to the conflicts
between capital and labor. "Hollow and vain words ,tT wrote
DOI)Qs c;>, 끼 that.h~would.~o~ ‘get.as.~apldlyas.the.frivolity
136.... -!'. .. -!' ..... ，..~Cited in DS~. 825.00/177 , Shea to Colby , October 15 ,
1920 , translated by-the Embassy staff.
137Donoso , p. 263.
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with which he had pronounced them!u138
The Cabinet presented its resignation; however , the
Alianza had no interest in assuming power at that moment ,
so it requested that the Ministry continue to function
until the expiration of Sanfuentes ’ term. Editorials in
most of the leading papers commented favorably on the
decision of the Tribunal , there was a noticeable easing
of tensions throughout Chile , and both political combina-
tions appeared relieved that the possibility of revolution
and widespread disorders had been averted , at least tempo~
rarily.139 The transmission of presidential power took
place on De cember 23 amidst tremendous popular enthusiasm
for the new chief executive: at last the people had their
candidate in power. There were many, though , who pre-
dieted that Alessandri would find it very difficult to
carry out his sweeping promises to the working classes in
the face of formidable congressional opposition. From the
• most pessimistic vantage point:
Now we have the agitator in La Moneda
disguised as ruler;in the exercise of
his duties he will apply the same methods
used during his entire political life , he
will stir up the masses , talk without let-
up , issue manifestos , write letters--to
fOJ;Q1. ~. dense. coJ,.1,lmn. o:f. smoke. hiO i.ng. the
138 onoso , p. 26μ. The text of the proclamation_is
included in the Appendixes.
l39nn T:l 0 n I:' 1"\1"\ /펀프. 825.00/177 , Shea to Colby , October 15 , 1920.
90
govern-많SRZ많r1Ea#eFiiEaEtsoEaR$§ff隨
•,
。s。mD
nu
h낙1
·i
L6itιjrl
→htE1r4~titi-§-
↑·「-;
riI
‘
5:4qPJi
-tf4-ξig;l
‘111μ
、1??---?
낀풍
F----JI1gτ-
→Ef*
짚훌훌훌세
r、-‘
}~1rx4ι
‘캉
U강，
‘-ιjt-(1P
」tiι
생
irx
”t*xιu~4
훌훌??「간￡**없훌훌훌훌￥
R‘*” 277.p.
體醒織購鷹빼聊톨廳\'뱉顧캔爾꿇顆願짧짧藝챙，"'，":톨寶續爛훌훌홈顆톨훨홉뺑聊屬觸빼했覆廳顆轉빼鷹뚫體廳!빼뤘聊聊聊體훌홉빼聊훌뚫훌훌톰
빼..............
폈續觸爛題L
VI. , CONCLUSION
The crisis of 1920 was not simply an electoral prob-
lem. Something deeper and more fundamental was involved;
the passive obedience of the Chilean masses to the oligarchy
had disappeared. For the first time a presidential candidate
had stumped thecountry to address the forgotten proletariat ,
and by means of his oratorical talents and his great personal
magnetism , Alessandri had drawn the w~rking classes to his
cause. They did not stop to question his sincerity or to
consider the tremendous obstacles standing in the way of
profound social change. Eduardo Frei viewed the situation
as "a great moment for the rise of'a caudillo who would
awaken a mystique and would express the vague aspirations
that stirred the masses."lμl
The presidential election had divided the country ,
as always , into two bands that would fight each other to
the death , but the contest of 1920 saw new factors enter
the struggle. While on other occasions political interest
centered in the directing classes , this time the election
brought up social and economic conflict which greatly
af~~ct~cl. the , proletariat.•. , The ALianza. candidate , cl.io not
141Edwards and Frei , p. 18나.
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create the issues for his own political purposes , but he
was clever enough to unite all the elements of agitation ,
dissatisfaction , and latent revolt which had been accumu-
lating for years andwhich finally rose to the surface
after Wqrld War I. The ruling classes , the traditi。nal
conservative elements of Chilean society , committed an
irreparable error by ignoring this discontent and attri-
buting it to artificial agitation. They failed to see
that the agitators used 막혈 legitimate causes for unrest
and manipulated those causes for their own purposes.
Alessandri promised to remedy all the ills which
plagued the workers: to solve all the problems which had
frustrated for more than twenty years such capable
reformer"s as Social ist labor leader Luis Recabarren. Yet
while the poverty-stricken masses rallied around their
messiah with an enthusiasm bordering on the fanatic , they
did not elect him. Since most were illiterate and thus
denied the right to vote ， lμ2 Alessandri ·needed the support
。f the middle sectors in order to reach the La Moneda.
That support at the ballot box brought him victory. There
was little in the early career of the Lion to indicate he
woulCl. b~co ll1e th~. ch~mpion. of. the. oown~t:roOOen:... be. waa aa
lμ2Scarcely more than 8% of the population cast
~ballots in th~pres~dentia1 election of 1920. E1 뾰rc뾰초으，
November 3 , 1925 , cited by Pike , p. 172. --
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dedicated to preserving the status quo as most of his col-
leagues in the lower Chamber. After 1915 , he did learn
first hand of the terrible plight of the workers in the
North , and he developed a mild sociaL conscience. He
probably was sincere in wanting to alleviate the suffering
of the lower classes , but he also recognized that limited
social legislation was vital to the preservation of order
in the Republic. Moreover , he sincerely believed in his
。wn destiny; his ambition often overrode his convictions.
The decision of the Tribunal of Honor was accepted
by the National Union because the likely alternative was
revolution. Besides , Alessandri"did not pose a grave
threat to the ruling clique , for he could not command ~
dependable majority coalition in Congress to pass any
sweeping reform legislation. Nor did he even propose
drastic changes in the form of government. The record
does not support the contention of most Latin Americanists
(authors of general works on Latin American and Chile) that
Alessandri openly advocated in 1920 the abo~효 tion of the
parliamentary system. He advocated only what others stated
vaguely: that the presidential powers shaul뼈 be somehow
expanded or strengthened , and that the provi뼈ces should
enjoy more autonomy. However , in 192니， after more than
three frustrating years of doing battle with a recalcitrant
Congress , he doubtless became convinced that the parliamentary
-’-
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9μ
unworkable.indeedsystem was
a。fopen1ngthesignaled1920yearthesum ,In
j•
IJs---kjl??A
숙아
ι」1f
‘、;:‘
Jυ
던
ι*
션rJ
끼용읍
1-J3fa*?iν~1A
Chile1nclimatepoliticaltraditionalthewhichineranew
explo-anthatacknowledgmentthemodified bymarkedlywas
Arturocountry.the1nexistedsituationsocialsive
•
,
+
LR
>
---‘때•」야P
‘
매
‘saV1or ,masses ,theofPalma--heroAlessandri
whofiguretransitionalthedestroyer--becamedemagogue ,
new ,aofcreationtheaboutbringing
Chile.
1ninstrumental
democratic
was
more
A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Although much has been written about the parliamentary
period in Chilean history (1891-1920) , there is a dearth of
available material concerning the early career of Arturo
Alessandri and his struggle to obtain the presidency. The
mostvaluable source in English consists of the Records 으효
the Department of State Relating to 효프르 Internal Affairs
으효 Chile , 1910-1929 . The reports of the 뾰포 효뾰 띤뾰프
are of limited usefulness. Also informative , though not
available in translation , are Alessandri's writings inclu-
ding Revoluci6n 뾰 뾰완: 판 actuacion (Santiago , 1950)
and particularly Recuerdos 뾰 gobiern。 : 효브띤inistraci6n
1920-1925 (Santiago , 1952) , the first of a projected two-
volume set of memoirs that Alessandri did not live to com-
plete. /Artur‘。 Olavarria Bravo , who became the senator ’ s
. private secretary early in the presidential campaign , has
written a four-volume history of recent Chilean politics
entitled Chile entre dos Alessandri: Memorias pol{ticas
(Santiago, 1962-1965) , and his first volume devotes a
brief section to Alessandri ’ s election and early years of
administration.
Outstanding among the secondary sources is the
definitive two-volume biography by the noted Chilean
‘’‘”’5“‘’”‘g“---영'WIInIn!'~’‘-앤뭘-커!’
엉Ilt...
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historian Ricardo Donoso , A1essandri , agitado갇 x demoledor:
Cincuenta arios 브로 historia po1{tica 브트 Chile (Mexico , 1952 ,
195μ). Though constituting a bitter denunciation of
Alessandri--which his family attempted to suppress--the work
was thoroughly researched and carefully documented. In con-
trast , a very sympathetic biography is Augusto Iglesias ,
Alessandri , 브므브 etapa 뾰 L효 democracia 르므 America (Santiago ,
1960) , a rather mediocre effort that lacks documentation.
Fora brief , somewhat superficial appraisal of Alessandri ,
there is a chapter dealing with his career in Robert J.
Alexander , Prophets 프 프뾰 Revolution (New York , 1962).
Other general works which ·contribute to an under-
standing of Chilean politics of the era are Alberto Edwards
Vives , 월 fronda aristocratica: Historia pol{tica 뾰 E판릎
(Santiago , 1959) , a classic now in its fifth edition; and
Alberto Edwards.Vives and Eduardo Frei Montalva , Historia
/브흐 죠으효 particlos politicos chilenos (Santiago , 19μ9). Luis
Galdames , 프 History 으효 Chile (2nd ed.; New York , 196μ) ， in
English translation , relates the history of the country from
conquestto the second World War , and Fredrick B. Pike , Chile
웰브 뾰르 United States , 1880-1962: 로브E Emergence 으E Chile ’ S
Social Crisis· 효뾰 E뾰 Challenge E으 UnitedStates Diplomacy
(Notre Dame , 1963) presents an excellent detailed study of
the recent national period , covering both domestic develop-
ments and foreign affairs. The best analysis of the Chilean
---‘-----_._._--ι←(→--~--←•-•••
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party system is 뀐뜯 Political System 으프 Chile by Federico
G.Gil.(Boston , 1966).
뺏톨홉톨톨
쉰F얀생잇
APPENDIX I
THE AGREEMENT TO FORM THE TRIBUNAL OF HONOR
The powers and formation of the.Tribunal of Honor
areset forth in the pact signed by the candidates and
representatives of the Liberal Alliance and National Union
as follows:
I.The representatives of the National Union
and the Liberal Alliance agree to submit , to a
court of arbiters , the protests which havebeen
formulated against the election of presidential
electors who voted or should have voted on
July 25 , 1920.
II. The Tribunal will be composed of Fernando
Lazcano , President of the Senate; Ramon Briones
Luco , President of the Chamber of Deputies;
Ismael Tocornal; Emiliano Figueroa; Luis Barriga;
Armando Quezada and Guillermo Subercaseaux. If
any of the persons forming the Tribunal are unable
to serve the other arbiters will , by unanimous
agreement , appoint substitutes.
III. The Tribunal will consider the electoral
claims in accordance with the Electoral Law; it
will have full power as a jury toconsider all
evidence submitted and it will also render deci-
sions on disputes which may be outside the prov-
ince of the electoral law. All protests not
accepted by the Tribunal will be eonsidered as
rejected.
IV. The Tribunal will have power to add elec-
tors if , by the protest submitted , it should appear
that the eliminated elector belonged to the opposite
politicalgroup. When an electoral fraud does not
clearly justify the additionof an elector , the
Tribunal will only eliminate the elector whose elec-
tion is , in the opinion of the Tribunal , illegal.
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v. The Tribunal will consider the votes of
those electors who., for any reason , did not vote
on July 25 , 1920; and will re-establish any alter-
ation which may have taken place in the votes cast
by the electors after that date - this being done
without prejudice to the protests made which refer
to the election of such electors. The Tribunal
will adopt for the study of the contested election ,
the following basis:
On June 25 , 1920 , 179 electors voted for
Arturo Alessandri and 174 voted for Barros Borgono:
and that , according to the previous paragraph , the
elector , Pastor Infante , who could not vote , would
have voted for Borgono.
VI. The Tribunal ’ s decision will be rendered by
an absolute majority of the total number of members
forming the Tribunal.
VII. The main purposes of the National Union and
theLiberal Alliance are that the arbiters shall
decide all claims regarding the election of presi-
dential electors , and that as soon as all the claims
are decided , they shall declare which of the tw。
candidates for the presidency of the Republic has
been elected in accordance with the resolutions
adopted by the Tribunal.
VIII. If neither of the two candidates obtains an
absolute majority of electors , the Tribunal will
declare which would have been elected if certain
acts had not taken place altering the legitimate
result of the election , - no matter what may be the
number of votes to which the candidates are reduced.
IX. If the result of the election , after all
claims have been decided upon by the Tribunal ,
should give an equal number of votes toboth candi-
dates , or if the Tribunal should decide that both
have equal rights , then Congress wi l. l freely elect
the President of the Republic from the two candi-
dates.
x. The representatives of the National Union
and the Liberal Alliance agree to this pact , moved
them to the highest sentiments of justice and social
。rder and desirous of maintaining the welfare of the
Republic; and they sign it with faitb that their
respective friends in the National αongress will
follow thedecisions of the arbitration Tri-
bunal when the time comes for Congress ,
according to the Constitution , to elect the
President of the Republic.
Translated by the Embassy staff
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APPENDIX II
ALESSANDRI ’ S PROCLAMATION
"Ireiterate my steady purpose of exerting
frommy post of President of the Republic
every legitimate influence in favor of the pro-
gram of workwhich I presented to the country
during my campaign.
"As President I will pay strict observance
to electoral liberty and will grant it amply
and without limitations. I will respect the
parliamentary system , seeking a close accord
andharmony between the Executive and Congress ,
as only with the mutual agreement of these two
powers of the State efficient Government action
is possible.
"During all my public life I have worked for
electoral liberty and for the respect of the
parliamentary system. I have always condemned
the men who , once elected , contradict with their
acts what they established in their programs. I
have the firm determination of not falling into
such an error; and my most constant effort will
be to obtain , when I abandon the high post to
which I have been elected , the public recognition
of my countrymen that I know how to prove with
acts whAt I maintained and preached.
!’The stabilization ofour money is an imperious
necessity which does not admit of further delays.
This problem must be met and solved with the patri-
otic energy required by a question of such wide
proportions and of such supreme importance from
the financial , economical and social point of
view.
"The social problems must be solved within a
spirit of solidarity and justice , always trying
to obtain the harmony between capital and labor ,
the only efficacious means to obtain all the
efficiency of these two great factors of the
economical progress of peoples.
"Capital must be respected and protected in
its ri흠hts; but to labor must be given also its
part of protection and justice. I have the
빼훌... 톨률훌톨 톨 톨톨톨톨톨톨III 8빼llII'JBII ;ASI’ ........를--삐’11II앙-톨빼.， -“-←~. N ,.....~~.......·‘ t ‘”“
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deepest conviction that the maintenance of
social peace and order - supreme aspiration
of all governing forces - are .solidly sup-
ported only upon the basis of strict justice
and of equal rights for all.
HI have , then , the absolute certainty that
during my Presidency there will be ample and
sincere electoral liberty; respect of parlia-
mentary system; stabilization of money; and
as to social problems , solidarity and justice ,
wi thin .the harmony which must exist between
capital and labor.
"These are my ideas and my convictions and
they represent the sacred pledgeI have con-
tracted with the country , because they sum up
what I have expressed from town to town and
from village to village of the Repub호 ic during
thelong democratic crusadewhich I started at
the beginning of the political campaign which
destiny crowned with success for the satisfac-
tion of all those that see in this victory the
beginning of an epoch ofwelfare and prosperity
for our country.'.'
Translated by the Embassy Staff
